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“The history of mankind can be written in terms of human interactions and interrelations 
with water.” 
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Sustainable agriculture is one of the greatest challenges of our time. The pathways to sustainable 
agriculture consist of successive decisions for optimization that are often a matter of negotiation 
as resources are shared at all levels. This work essentially comprises three research projects with 
novel inter- and transdisciplinary methods to better understand and optimize agricultural water 
management under water scarcity conditions.  
In the first project, climate variability in the US Corn Belt was analyzed with a focus on deficit 
irrigation to find the optimal irrigation strategies for possible future changes. Two optimization 
methods for deficit irrigation showed positive water savings and yield increases in the predicted 
water scarcity scenarios.  
In the second project, a serious board game was developed and game sessions were carried out 
to simulate the complex decision space of actors in irrigated agriculture under climate and 
groundwater variability. The aim of the game was to understand how decisions are made by 
actors by observing the course of the game and linking these results to common behavioral 
theories implemented in socio-ecological models. 
In the third project, two frameworks based on innovation theories and agro-social-hydrological 
networks were developed and tested using agent-based models. In the first framework, 
centralized and decentralized irrigation management in Kansas US was compared to observe the 
development of collective action and the innovation diffusion of sustainable irrigation strategies. 
The second framework analyzed different decision processes to perform a sensitivity analysis of 
innovation implementation, groundwater abstraction and saline water intrusion in the Al Batinah 
region in Oman. Both frameworks allowed the evaluation of diverse behavior theories and 
decision-making parameters to find the optimal irrigation management and the impact of diverse 
socio-ecological policies.  
Inter- and Trans-disciplinary simulations of the interactions between human decisions and water 
systems, like the ones presented in here, improve the understanding of irrigation systems as 
anthropogenic landscapes in socio-economic and ecological contexts. The joint application of 
statistical and participatory approaches enables different but complementary perspectives that 









Eine nachhaltige Landwirtschaft ist eine der größten Herausforderungen unserer Zeit und um 
diese zu erreichen müssen verschiedene Optimierungsentscheidungen getroffen werden. Da 
Ressourcen auf allen Ebenen geteilt werden, sind diese Entscheidungen oft Gegenstand von 
Abwägungen und Verhandlungen. Diese Arbeit umfasst drei Forschungsprojekte, welche mit 
neuartigen inter- und transdisziplinären Methoden entwickelt wurden, um ein besseres 
Verständnis des landwirtschaftlichen Wassermanagements unter 
Wasserknappheitsbedingungen zu entwickeln und dieses zu optimieren. 
Im ersten Projekt wurde eine Defizitbewässerung unter Klimavariabilitätsbedingungen im US-
Maisgürtel analysiert, um die optimalen Bewässerungsstrategien für mögliche zukünftige 
Veränderungen zu finden. Zwei Optimierungsmethoden für die Defizitbewässerung zeigten 
Ertragssteigerungen bei gleichzeitigen Wassereinsparungen unter vorhergesagten 
Wasserknappheitsszenarien. 
Im zweiten Projekt wurde ein Serious Board Game entwickelt, um den komplexen 
Entscheidungsraum der Akteure bei der Bewässerung in der Landwirtschaft unter sich änderten 
Klima- und Grundwasserbedingungen zu simulieren. Ziel des Spiels war es, durch Beobachtung 
des Spielverlaufs zu verstehen, wie Akteure Entscheidungen treffen. Diese Ergebnisse wurden 
anschließend mit gängigen Verhaltenstheorien von sozio-ökologischen Modellen verglichen. 
Im dritten Projekt wurden zwei agentenbasierende Modelle, aufbauend auf Innovationstheorien 
in agro-sozial-hydrologischen Netzwerken, entwickelt. Im ersten Modell wurde ein zentralisiertes 
und ein dezentrales Bewässerungsmanagement in Kansas, USA, miteinander verglichen, um die 
Entstehung von kollektivem Handeln und die Innovationsdiffusion von nachhaltigen 
Bewässerungsstrategien zu beobachten. Das zweite Modell analysierte verschiedene 
Entscheidungsprozesse, um eine Sensitivitätsanalyse der Innovationsimplementierung, der 
Grundwasserentnahme und der Salzwasserintrusion in der Region Al Batinah in Oman, 
durchzuführen. Beide Modelle erlaubten die Bewertung verschiedener Verhaltenstheorien und 
Entscheidungsparameter, um das optimale Bewässerungsmanagement und die Auswirkungen 
verschiedener sozio-ökologischer Richtlinien zu ermitteln. 
Inter- und transdisziplinäre Modelle, welche die Wechselwirkungen zwischen menschlichen 
Entscheidungen und Wassersystemen untersuchen, wie sie hier vorgestellt wurden, führen zu 
einem besseren Verständnis von Bewässerungssystemen als anthropogene Landschaften in 
einem sozioökonomischen und ökologischen Kontext. Die gemeinsame Anwendung von 
statistischen und partizipativen Ansätzen ermöglicht unterschiedliche, aber komplementäre 
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Rapidly growing human populations simultaneously influence and are influenced by the 
availability of water resources to support life and economic activity [1]. It is estimated that global 
agricultural production will rise by 60% by 2050 to meet the world's projected demands for food 
and feed [2]. Nevertheless, water resources are still a paradox, as the resource is scarce, but it is 
often wasted [3]. Uneven distribution of water in space and time along with negative impacts on 
the quality of water resources have created significant complexities in managing this resource. 
Water scarcity, i.e., limited access or availability of the resource, is a global issue that has caused 
and will cause numerous conflicts in competing interests such as agricultural, industrial, and 
domestic uses, hydropower generation, recreation, and environmental protection [4, 5]. 
Meanwhile, the value of water resources itself and the many services it provides has not been 
fully recognized and hence it has been utilized inefficiently in many places. The improvement of 
agricultural water productivity is widely considered as the best solution to ensure that future 
water demand does not exceed water availability [3]. 
Water resources management decisions ultimately involve competing values, which will only get 
more prominent with increasing scarcity and security over resources [6]. To date, conventional 
water resources management is dominated by technocratic approaches that may work well in 
the short-term but can result in unintended consequences in the long-term [3]. These approaches 
lack to reflect the dynamic relationship between natural, technical, and social dimensions of 
human-water systems [7]. The integrated water resources management (IWRM) paradigm 
requires governments to consider how water resources link different parts of society and how 
decisions in one sector may affect water users in other sectors, as well as to adopt a participatory 
and inclusive approach by involving all actors and stakeholders, from all levels, who use and 
potentially pollute water, so that it is managed equitably and sustainably [8]. Therefore, 
stakeholder decision-making must then be analyzed as integral and endogenous components of 
the agricultural network [1], where how risk and innovation (i.e., application of new 
ideas/methods/solutions that meet new requirements) are perceived determines the actions that 
people take towards the use of resources potentially creating unexpected effects [9].  
 
1.1 Complex Networks Approach 
Networks are systems in which multiple nodes are connected by links. Natural water systems can 
be described as complex networks consisting of nodes such as sources (e.g., surface and 
groundwater), demand points (e.g., agriculture), and links that transport water above and below 
the soil surface and to and from the demand points (e.g., pipes and pumps).  
Agricultural water management is a perfect example of a complex network, in which ecological, 
social, and economic demands interact and evolve simultaneously. Nevertheless, current 
scientific research and policies are still constrained to a single discipline/sector. To analyze the 
possible future evolution and the impact of man-made or natural shocks to the agricultural 
network, a combination of diverse disciplines and methodologies is required where the 
complexities and interactions are to be analyzed.  
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During the last decade, much scientific effort has been made to underpin integrative water 
resources management by providing a theoretical basis with network theory that takes into 
consideration the hydrological component (e.g., soil, climate, crop phenology), the hydraulic 
components (e.g., pipe, pumps), and the socio-economic component represented by the 
stakeholders (farmers, managers, policy-makers, etc.) and dynamic economy. The main goal of 
the implementation of a complex network approach is to represent these components as nodes 
and their processes as links where the feedback dynamics, nonlinearity, thresholds, 
heterogeneity are emphasized [10, 11] and observe their behavior to develop integrative and 
sustainable management practices. 
Improving the complex network's resilience and reducing susceptibility are prime concerns for all 
stakeholders responsible for the design, operation, and protection of the agricultural 
management [12]. Optimization of these complex networks, i.e., the identification of robust and 
resilient management strategies, is not possible until a full understanding of the two-way 
dynamics between demands particularly under different sources of uncertainty (e.g., climate 
variability, soil conditions, and market demand) is achieved.  
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
 
Figure 1: Focused transdisciplinary A-S-H network. 
While much progress has been made in making quantitative assessments of water scarcity impact 
in agriculture, there remains a lack of fundamental understanding of the interaction between 
human-water systems and the impact of water scarcity in this interaction. As a result, the current 
analytical frameworks cannot capture the emerging dynamics. Furthermore, to close this 
knowledge gap it is required to combine diverse methodologies in an inter- and trans-disciplinary 
effort where stakeholder participation is vital.  
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This research aims to provide scientific insights that can be used to inform IWRM by detecting 
and understanding the relations between physical and social processes in an Agro-Social-
Hydrological (A-S-H) complex network (Figure 1) and the impact of water scarcity on this network. 
To accomplish this goal, diverse methodologies were developed and analyzed that aimed to 
answer the following research questions: 
1. How will water scarcity impact agricultural production and what are the optimal irrigation 
adaptation strategies? 
2. How to collect data regarding the socio-hydrological dynamics in agriculture? 
3. How to simulate agro-socio-hydrological networks to optimize agricultural water 
management and evaluate policies impact? 
Consequently, the main objectives of this research were: 
1. Evaluate the impacts of climate variability and compare diverse irrigation strategies. 
2. Develop a participatory data collection approach to understand the human-water 
dynamics in agriculture. 
3. Analyze diverse decision-making theories and social parameters in an integrative 
agricultural network model. 
While the ultimate goal of the implemented complex network approach is to integrate all parts of 
the A-S-H network, this is challenging to achieve in practice. Therefore, the presented projects 
enhanced different nodes and links to propose effective and integrative frameworks for 
sustainable agricultural management practices. The cover page for each chapter shows a 
graphical representation of the focused nodes of the transdisciplinary A-S-H network. 
 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
The thesis is organized into six chapters: 
 Chapter 1: General introduction to the complex agricultural water network. The specific 
research questions and objectives are then described in this chapter. 
 Chapter 2: An in-depth literature review of the multidisciplinary approaches toward 
sustainable agricultural water management, focusing on novel transdisciplinary and 
participatory approaches. The main concepts and definitions of the following chapters 
are described in this chapter. 
 Chapter 3: Summarizes the first selected publication where the hydroclimatic variability 
experienced and projected throughout the US Corn Belt was analyzed and several 
irrigation strategies were evaluated to find optimal agricultural management practices.  
 Chapter 4: Summarizes the second selected publication where an innovative data 
collection method was developed based on a serious game to detect the main social 
parameters towards collective action and evaluated the most common decision-making 
theories. Additionally, this chapter presents a more in-depth evaluation of collaborative 
and participatory approaches to improve education for sustainability. 
 Chapter 5: Summarizes the third selected publication which describes the development 
and implementation of two agent-based models of a socio-hydrological system where 
social innovation diffusion (i.e., how and at what rate a new irrigation strategy spreads) 
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and diverse behavior theories are applied in a multilevel social network (i.e., network 
composed of social agents connected by different types of links).  
 Chapter 6: Summarizes the main contributions of the overall research project and 











2. Literature Review 
2.1 Agro-Hydrological Systems 
Agriculture is the largest consumer of water resources, globally it is estimated that about 70% of 
freshwater abstracted is used to irrigate 25% of the world’s croplands which supply 45% of global 
food [13, 14]. In the last few decades, large-scale irrigation systems have become a major source 
of water for a large proportion of the world’s croplands [15]. Hence, water demand for irrigation 
purposes is increasing and thus, conflicts about the use of water and allocation are becoming 
more intense [13].  
Agriculture is facing many challenges both in economic terms (i.e., productivity and revenue 
deficits) and ecological terms (i.e., environmental and health impacts) [16]. Researchers, in 
specific agrohydrologists, have focused on the evaluation of the two-way influence of available 
water resources and land management practices, and the development of conservation practices 
[17]. The leading scientific approach to achieve this optimization is the development and 
implementation of water demand management practices with the main goal of increasing the 
resilience of agrohydrological systems [18]. These practices have multiple benefits, like deferring 
new costly water supply infrastructure, promoting water use efficiency, and increasing public 
awareness. However, the lack of integrated knowledge (i.e., multiple objectives) and behavior 
heterogeneity of stakeholders hinder the adoption of these optimized practices.  
Previous research evaluated the main factors correlated with water scarcity and consequent 
conservation behavior [19]. For example, reviews by Ervin and Ervin [20], Gould et al. [21], and 
Traore et al. [22] found that both physical (i.e. soil, crop, recharge) and social (i.e. education level, 
years of experience, etc.) characteristics are positively correlated with the degree to which 
farmers perceive of agrohydrological problems (e.g. soil erosion, climate change impacts, 
degraded water quality.). Recent reviews by Knowler and Bradshaw [23] and Prokopy et al. [24] 
found the critical parameters for successful adoption of conservation practices in agriculture, i.e., 
education, income, farm size, environmental awareness, water access, and land ownership. 
Recent research by Chouinard et al. [25] found that farmers are driven by a “meta-utility” that 
seeks to balance motives of self-interest with non-egoistic motives related to community and 
environmental well-being. 
 
2.1.1 Necessary Disciplinary Convergence 
As previous research has highlighted, the interdisciplinary nature of managing complex 
agrohydrological systems requires methods that integrate the technical, economic, 
environmental, and social aspects into comprehensive frameworks [26]. In this regard, science in 
general, agrohydrology in particular, is being challenged by a necessary disciplinary convergence 
(Figure 2), i.e., multi-, inter-, and trans-disciplinarity, to tackle scientific and societal challenges that 
exist at the interfaces of multiple fields [27]. The diverse disciplinary convergence is increasingly 
used in the literature and refers to the involvement of multiple disciplines to varying degrees on 
the same continuum, yet it is ambiguously defined and interchangeably used.  
There is growing recognition that different types of expertise are needed, and among the most 
cited of these are the concepts of inter- and trans-disciplinarity research. For this research project, 
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the goal was to develop a comprehensive transdisciplinary framework towards sustainable 
agricultural water management which requires multi-objective optimization.  
 
Figure 2: Disciplinary convergence and evolution of science. 
 
2.1.2 Multi-Objective Optimization Approaches 
Multi-objective modeling aims to handle problems that simultaneously need to optimize not just 
one objective function, but several. These techniques include multi-targeting optimization, Pareto 
analysis, and fuzzy optimization. Multi-objective optimization approaches integrate different 
system processes into a combined framework. These approaches are considered to be useful 
tools to understand the complex interaction between social and ecological processes and to 
evaluate how these responds to various changes [28]. Within the last decade, significant progress 
has been made concerning interdisciplinary investigation and modeling of coupled social-
ecological systems (SES) [29]. These approaches include combining material or energy flows and 
economic flows, modeling social behavior and drivers that specifically impact on an ecosystem 
service, and identifying and modeling specific goods that are relevant for the social system as well 
as for the ecological system.  
Integrated modeling frameworks currently used to optimize agrohydrological systems mainly 
focus on the irrigation‐induced aquifer depletion and its economic impacts [30]. There are two 
main types of optimization approaches centralized and decentralized management. The 
centralized perspective usually refers to a command-and-control process in which a central unit 
collects all necessary information and makes decisions for each user to achieve better system 
performance. The decentralized perspective generally stands for a bottom-up procedure in which 
each user makes individual decisions based on their information and then all individual decisions 
merge to form the system’s overall performance. The centralized approaches are normally 
2. Literature Review 
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considered more effective in terms of achieving better system performance, but less effective 
with regards to participation and compliance levels of users [18]. Most common multi-objective 
optimization approaches for sustainable agricultural water management follow the centralized 
approach and focused on two main objectives: the optimization of crop-water productivity and 
the analysis of climate variability impacts.  
 
2.2 Optimization of Crop-Water Productivity 
The overall objective of agricultural water management is to maximize the benefits of water 
resources to society. This overall objective can further be divided into three specific objectives:  
1. Social equity: water resources are shared equitably among different users and between 
uses and the environment.  
2. Economic efficiency: to achieve maximum benefits from water utilization, including both 
direct and indirect benefits.  
3. Environmental sustainability: to ensure the availability of water resources for future 
users, uses, and the environment.  
The valuation of agricultural water use is normally estimated by a crop-water production function 
(CWPF) because the variability of crop yields for a given amount of irrigation constitutes an 
economic risk [31]. As an indicator, CWPFs have been used to show the obtainable yield at 
different levels of applied water. The relationship becomes curvilinear as applied water increases 
further, due to losses from increased surface evaporation, runoff, and deep percolation. 
Moreover, local factors, such as soil moisture and irrigation efficiency, can affect the shape. Due 
to the stochasticity of climatic factors, it is necessary to associate CWPFs with a probability 
function, in other words, stochastic crop-water production function (SCWPF) [32] that are mainly 
impacted by climate variability. 
Climate variability is defined as variations in the mean state and other statistics of the climate 
over a given time and spatial scales, beyond individual weather events [33]. This variability may 
be due to natural internal processes or anthropogenic external factors. A stochastic model of 
climate variability is considered in which slow changes of climate are explained as the integral 
response to continuous deviations.  
In the context of increasing impacts of climate variability on agricultural systems, greater access 
to and use of climate information and forecasts has the potential to critically support farmers' 
efforts to manage and reduce risk, increase profits, and improve short- and long-term irrigation 
strategies [16].  
 
2.2.1 Irrigation Strategies 
The adoption of irrigation technology has increased over the last several decades to improve 
yields in areas with high climate variability [34]. Irrigation scheduling is conventionally based 
either on soil water measurement, i.e., the soil moisture is measured to determine the need for 
irrigation, or by soil-water balance calculations estimated by the change in soil moisture over a 
period given by the difference between the inputs and the losses [35]. Ultimately, the choice of 
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irrigation scheduling method depends to a large degree on the objectives of the irrigators and 
the irrigation system available. 
Full irrigation via water application with the crop evapotranspiration requirements method is an 
effective irrigation practice. In traditional irrigation scheduling, a technique to meet full irrigation, 
the soil moisture in the root zone is allowed to fluctuate between an upper limit approximating 
field capacity and the lower limit of the readily accessible water [34].  
Deficit irrigation is an irrigation practice whereby a crop is irrigated with an amount of water 
below the full requirement for optimal plant growth, thereby saving water and minimizing the 
economic impact on the harvest. By limiting water applications to drought-sensitive growth stages 
such as the vegetative stages and the late-ripening period, this approach aims to maximize water 
productivity and to stabilize, rather than maximize yields. The major obstacles are that deficit 
irrigation involves the use of precision irrigation and some risks associated with the uncertainty 
of the knowledge required [36]. 
Common approaches to calculating optimal irrigation schedules involve dynamic programming 
for the optimization of closed-loop irrigation scheduling problems. An alternative approach is 
provided by open-loop scheduling techniques such as linear and nonlinear programming [37]. 
Open-loop optimization is based on forecasts generated by simulation or analytic functions of the 
water budget and crop production of an irrigation system for an entire growing period in advance. 
The global evolutionary technique for optimal irrigation scheduling (GET-OPTIS) was developed 
by Schütze et al. [38], takes into account the influence of the stochastic climate variability to solve 
the irrigation optimization problem. 
 
2.3 Sustainable Management of A-S-H Networks 
Agricultural networks are embedded in wider social-ecological processes that must be considered 
in any complete discussion of sustainable irrigation practices. Just as climatic profiles and 
irrigation scheduling will influence the future viability of crops, agricultural governance practices 
create the conditions that foster sustainable agrohydrological systems [39].  
The latest research has highlighted the need for the involvement of stakeholders and experts to 
support learning and decision-making processes for achieving improved environmental and 
social outcomes [40, 41]. Nevertheless, the difficulty involved in accounting for social components 
is attributed to a holistic and mechanistic bias inherited from hydrology. The concept of dynamics 
proposed by hydrologists is very different from that proposed by social scientists. Some methods 
have been developed to describe social dynamics (i.e. farmers' decision-making processes) such 
as the model for actions [42], rule-based models (heuristics and game theory) [43], and activity-
based models [44].  
The current scientific challenge is to look for pragmatic ways to link the analysis of social dynamics 
with the understanding of the hydrological processes. This requires hydrology to open up further 
to different approaches and methods used in other scientific disciplines, especially social 
sciences. This could lead to a transdisciplinary innovative way of conceiving and representing A-
S-H networks. Many disciplines have developed their frame of reference for the analysis of natural 
resources management, for example, in the fields of common-pool resources management [45], 
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complex adaptive systems [46], the resilience of social and ecological systems [47], or for the 
hydro-social cycle by critical geographers and political ecologists [48].  
 
2.3.1 Socio-Hydrology 
The Scientific Decade 2013–2022 of the International Association of Hydrological Sciences, 
entitled "Panta Rhei—Everything Flows" has dedicated to improved interpretation of the 
processes governing the water cycle by focusing on their changing dynamics in connection with 
rapidly changing human systems [49, 50]. Panta Rhei researchers proposed socio-hydrology 
(Figure 3) as a use‐inspired scientific discipline that entails the study of real‐world systems across 
gradients of climate, socioeconomic status, ecological degradation, and human management 
[51]. 
 
Figure 3: Socio-hydrological system. 
The focus of socio-hydrology is on understanding why certain water management outcomes arise 
rather than proposing centralized management solutions [3] because it treats society as an 
endogenous part of the water cycle and studies not only the impact of people on the water but 
also of water on people [52]. This results in a better understanding of long-term developments, 
predictions, and support for new water management. The most frequent socio-hydrology 
approach proposed in literature is based on multi-objective modeling frameworks in which 
variables depicting human behavior interact with hydrological variables [9, 41]. The social 
component is represented by a set of variables and relations among them, together with 
hydrological variables that can be translated into equations. A key benefit of the socio-hydrology 
framework is that it allows a structured and consistent comparative analysis of diverse case 
studies across contexts, thereby facilitating the discovery of generalizable patterns [5]. However, 
these approaches remain limited in their potential to support theory on their own because they 
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are often limited by extensive data requirements and concerns related to the transferability of 
modeled outcomes [53]. 
 
2.3.2 Representation of Decision-Making Processes 
The social component has been incorporated into socio-hydrological models as adaptive 
decision-making processes [54]. Adaptation refers to the development and implementation of 
innovation in A-S-H networks in response to actual or expected changes [55].  
In the early 1980s, Petit [56] developed the theory of the farmer’s adaptive behavior that claims 
that farmers have a permanent capacity for adaptation. Another important concept in the 
scientific literature is the concept of the adaptive capability to resist evolving stresses and adjust 
its practices to moderate or offset damages [57]. Holling [58] proposed a general framework to 
represent the dynamics of a socio-ecological system based on the permanent need to keep 
adaptation capability under uncertainty, in which dynamics are represented as a sequence of 
adaptive cycles. There are three main approaches to simulate these adaptive capabilities in socio-
hydrology (i) game theory models, (ii) agent-based models (ABM), (iii) participatory modeling [1]. 
 
Theory Definition 
Satisficing theory [59] It assumes that the decision-makers have an aspiration level. 
They sequentially assess their choice options and stop the 
search for better options as soon as they have found one that 
meets their aspiration level. 
Values–beliefs–norms 
theory [60] 
Grounded firmly in social–psychological theory and has been 
empirically tested as a framework for understanding how 
cultural factors shape environmental decision-making. 
Belief–desire–intention 
theory [61] 
Model of human practical reasoning as a way of explaining the 
future-directed intention. 
Table 1: Models of decision formation commonly used in socio-ecological models. 
 
The establishment and successful management of an irrigation system is affected by the 
governance mechanism and the collective actions of users. Numerous studies find that modern 
irrigation systems rely on cooperation among various stakeholders [15]. Until very recently, most 
models of human behavior (i.e., representation of decision-making processes) have been based 
on the overly simplistic view originating from economics also known as homo economicus [62]. 
However, the key assumptions of this theory (i.e., perfect knowledge, stable preferences, 
selfishness, and utility maximization) are in contrast with empirical observations of how people 
make decisions concerning natural resource use. Humans are not optimization algorithms. We 
do not always act on their plans and have limited self-control. Since the early 1950s economist 
and political scientists pointed out that our cognitive capacities are limited, restricting our capacity 
for utility maximization. We are also intrinsically pro-social, socially, and culturally part of the 
biosphere. To identify the reasons behind this social paradox, understanding the indigenous and 
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psychological factors (i.e., attitudes, beliefs, social norms, desires, etc.) of water users' behavior is 
necessary [63]. Table 1 shows common theories that have been implemented in SES models. 
Few model simulations like the model of the global policy response to climate change by Janssen 
and de Vries [64] determined decisions as a weighted average of the individual decision of agents 
based on their worldview and the experience with previous implementations. Some of the most 
prominent theories include economic theory coupled with resource dynamics [65] capture 
aggregated responses in feedback loops [66], or use ad-hoc assumptions [67]. The challenges in 
selecting alternative theories into socio-ecological models are (i) the wide range of theories across 
disciplines, (ii) some of these theories focused on very detailed and narrow aspects, while others 
are very broad and comprehensive, (iii) there is diverse formalization (experimental, conceptual, 
empirical) methodologies, (iv) natural and social systems variate in different time scales which 
require an understanding of causal mechanisms by making assumptions.  
Agricultural decision-making models often focus on behavior assumptions of long-term exit and 
entry decisions [68]. A recent review by Huber et al. [69] identified several key properties of 
farmers' decision-making, which include (i) the multi-output nature of production; (ii) the 
importance of non-agricultural activities; (iii) heterogeneous farmers' characteristics; and (iv) the 
need for concurrent short- and long-term decision-making. However, the reviewed models failed 
to represent the farmers' emotions, values, learning, risk, uncertainty, or impact of complex social 
interactions.  
 
Figure 4: MoHuB framework. 
Even when there is increasing recognition of the importance of implementing a more realistic 
decision-making representation into models. Modelers face the challenge to choose the right 
decision-making theory for their specific location and multi-objective optimization because any 
chosen theory will not specify all aspects of the decision-making and require additional 
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assumptions and data. Therefore, research has focused on implementing different behavioral 
theories into SES models, which will allow for sensitivity analysis of resource management 
outcomes, assessment of the consequences of management strategies, and help design better 
policies [53, 70].  
To facilitate the implementation of diverse behavior theories, Schülter et al. [71] designed the 
Modeling Human Behavior (MoHuB) framework where the decision-making process is 
decomposed in (i) what goes in (perception), (ii) the rules of selection and evaluation, and (iii) what 
goes out (behavior). As shown in Figure 4, the framework consists of two main decision 
environments: the social and biophysical environment and the internal one. The latter is formed 
by structural elements (state and perceived behavioral options) and internal processes (selection 
and evaluation).  
 
2.3.3 Influence of Social Network  
 
Figure 5: Steps of the diffusion of agricultural innovation. 
An individual’s behavior is not only influenced by the incentive of their economic interests but 
also influenced by other individuals in their social network, creating a process is called social 
innovation [72]. Such influences have been referred to as, among many other terms, 
neighborhood effects. In the formation of cooperation, neighborhood effects occur in the 
channels of information transmission. Individuals who are uncertain about the expected payoffs 
tend to use information from others (social comparison or imitation) instead of relying on their 
information (deliberation or repetition).  
Social Network Analysis (SNA) is a field that studies the characterization and analysis of social 
structure and interaction through network representations, traditionally, focused on static 
networks (i.e., networks that do not change their structure over time). Recently, much progress 
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has been made in understanding the processes of growth and change of real-world networks 
[73]. Dynamic SNA is a new field that incorporates the mechanisms of network growth and change 
based on agent interaction processes. 
Innovation is an important concept for the development of sustainable agriculture practices. The 
development and adoption of agricultural innovations interact with the main parts (economic, 
social, environmental) of sustainability. Figure 5 shows the diffusion of innovation by Rogers [74] 
and the intersections necessary for A-S-H innovation [75] which strongly depend on the social, 
institutional system behind the conservation technological features of the innovation. The 
analysis of the drivers of the innovation diffusion in agriculture is therefore a very interesting 
topic for studies of shocks and resilience in networks. 
 
2.4 Socio-Hydrological Modeling Approaches 
2.4.1 Game Theory Approach 
Because water allocation is a problem involving multiple stakeholders with different interests, 
conflicts usually arise that require negotiations and cooperation to find an optimal resolution. 
Game theory, a powerful tool for negotiation modeling, is the mathematical analysis of the 
interaction between players, where the amount of payoff that a player receives is dependent on 
the player’s own decision, as well as the decisions of the other players [76]. 
Game theory models implicitly specify the rules of the game [77]. There are two ways to 
determine the cooperation in the game: 
 Non-cooperative game theory: actors adopt a self-optimizing attitude to meet their 
objectives and derive stable outcomes as equilibria [78]. 
 Cooperative game theory: actors have a willingness to communicate, coordinate 
actions, and pool resources [79]. 
A game can be repeated several times, also known as the evolutionary game-theoretic approach, 
where actors adapt their strategy based on the decisions of the other players in the past and 
future [76, 80]. Game theory models assume a constant population size and play out until some 
steady-state value is obtained [81]. Game theory outcomes often differ from results suggested by 
multi-objective optimization methods which assume all parties are willing to act towards the best 
system-wide outcome and know exactly what options exist and what the corresponding costs and 
benefits are. Hence these outcomes are closer to practice because reflects the behaviors of the 
involved actors [78].  
The most common implementation of game theory in water resources is the Tragedy of 
Commons by Hardin [82], which describes situations where people share resources and external 
intervention is needed to avoid resource overexploitation [83]. The leading explanation for 
overexploitation of common-pool resources is a phenomenon documented extensively at the 
aggregate level called free riding, i.e., when an individual makes a personal gain far greater than 
the loss that he incurs as a member of the community [84]. Nevertheless, extensive studies have 
argued that people are pro-social and that humans are uniquely altruistic, willingly sacrificing 
their welfare to benefit others [85]. An alternative explanation for free-riding is that individuals 
are trying to maximize their financial gain, but they are not playing the game perfectly [86]. This 
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hypothesis predicts individuals initially cooperate to some degree because they are uncertain or 
they are mistaken about how the payoffs operate, or perhaps they operate a heuristic from every-
day life that starts off cooperating without calculating the consequences [87].  
Recent studies about game theory and irrigation are related one way or another with social 
learning and adapting behavior. For example, Finger and Borer [88] applied game theory to 
identify the factors contributing to the continuation of traditional irrigation systems in Switzerland 
even though irrigation is no longer profitable. Kimmich [89] associated groundwater irrigation 
with electricity policies for irrigation in India and depicted social learning as a sequential nested 
coordination game.  
Although modeling can help understand the complex interaction between human and nature, the 
previous studies have not been able to simulate this system precisely due to the lack of suitable 
mathematical models for the analysis of systems with self-optimizing stakeholders, and the lack 
of information about the properties and behavior of the stakeholders in common-pool resource 
systems due to the absence of the detailed regulatory system [90]. In recent years, top-down 
approaches are being replaced by bottom-up approaches in water resources like ABM.  
 
2.4.2 Agent-Based Modeling 
Previous approaches have developed Bayesian networks [28] with limited data from this region 
at a farm-scale to analyze the links between the hydrological and socio-economic processes. 
However, these Bayesian networks use discrete sates rather than probability distributions, which 
leads to misinformed modeling results. Bayesian networks require high-quality input data to 
estimate the linkages which make the assessment very computationally expensive and are acyclic, 
and thus do not support feedback loops. Additionally, Bayesian networks only capture casual 
relationships between the specified variables, which limits the capabilities to estimate 
correlations between A-S-H processes that show complex behavior.  
The power of ABMs comes from the most basic technique for tackling any complex problem which 
is to divide it into smaller, more manageable chunks [91]. ABMs provide a tool to represent the 
human decision-making process explicitly and simulate agents' actual behaviors by delineating 
interactions among them.  
The use of ABMs approaches to optimize agricultural policies has been progressively increasing 
over the last few years [69, 92]. The major advantages of ABMs include:  
 Representation of the different conflicting interests and goals of different agents resulting 
in more natural and transparent descriptions of the systems where the bidirectional 
relationship between the individuals and the system and the emergent behavior can be 
modeled; 
 Robustness against failure with distributed control and responsibilities; 
 Scalability through easy agent addition and modification; 
 Accommodation of uncertainty and dynamics of the task environment due to explicit 
representations of geographical environments. 
An agent-based model typically contains five main components [93] as shown in Figure 6 
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1. A set of agents with heterogeneous attributes; 
2. Decision methods that control how agents update their attributes; 
3. Adaptation of the involved social and environmental systems; 
4. Interaction mechanism of when, how, and with whom agents interact; 
5. An environment in which agents are located. 
 
Figure 6: Common socio-hydrological ABM components. 
The characteristics of the software are crucially important in assuring the success of formalizing 
ABMs. The best way to improve the quality of modeling is to choose object-oriented 
programming. This choice simplifies the translation of the problem into a set of agents and 
events, and these become objects and steps activated by loops in the model. The Overview, 
Design Concepts, and Details (ODD) [94] protocol was published in 2006 to standardize the 
published descriptions of ABMs with the main goal is to make ABMS more understandable and 
reproducible in different scenarios.  
Empirically-oriented ABMs draw on a large number of different data sources to develop and 
parameterize their agents. Where new data collection is required to inform model and theory 
development, researchers may consider incorporating social concepts into the experimental 
design [95]. Behavioral experiments have been used extensively to study factors affecting 
resource governance [96]. High data requirements have often been cited as an important 
drawback of ABM; on the other hand, ABMs provide considerable flexibility in the representation 
of processes, which can be tailored according to the available data. Robinson et al. [97] review 
data collection approaches for empirical ABMs and classify them into six categories: (i) sample 
surveys; (ii) participant observation; (iii) field and laboratory experiments; (iv) companion 
modeling (ComMod); (v) GIS and remotely sensed spatial data; (vi) secondary data sources such 
as agricultural censuses, farm accounting data, and agronomic data provided by extension 
services. The strength of novel data collection methods (e.g., games and participatory models) is 
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the possibility to elucidate behavior that (i) is not easily captured by structured interviews; (ii) 
cannot be inferred from statistical data; or (iii) does not necessarily comply with standard 
economic assumptions. 
Although it is relatively new modeling approach, ABMs have already become a widely used 
approach for the analysis, modeling, and simulation of complex A-S-H networks [4]. Kock [98] 
used ABMs in socio-hydrological systems to investigate the societal effects of incorporating an 
additional institution to the existing water resources management institutions. Soman et al. [99] 
developed a multi-ABM to capture multiple farmer typology behaviors in making land-use 
decisions that affect production. Barthel et al. [100] develop a multi-ABM that simulates the 
decision-making process of the water supply sector due to the effects of climatic change. Nikolic 
et al. [101] integrated system dynamics simulation with ABMs to provide support for integrated 
water resources management through analysis of spatial and temporal dynamics of water 
resources systems. Berger [102] used ABM to manage agricultural land use and water resources. 
Recent reviews of implemented ABMs stated that the complex and context-dependent nature of 
human decision-making resulted in ad-hoc representations of human decisions with certain 
characteristics (e.g., uncertainty, adaptation, learning, interactions, and heterogeneities of agents) 
[70]. However, most representations are not explicitly based on a specific theory, and if so, they 
are mostly based on economic theories. 
 
2.4.3 Participatory Modeling 
Stakeholders, non-specialists in most situations, do not easily envision the non-linear links 
between their decisions and the environmental consequences within the system of interest [11]. 
Participatory modeling is one tool that can be used to explore potential outcomes and help 
stakeholders develop their preferences into social values to manage and adapt to environmental 
change [103]. Public participation can be a means to obtain data from the public, to educate them, 
and to promote model results and subsequent decisions [52]. Also, it can be a means to involve 
the public in the modeling itself and give them control over what is modeled exactly and what 
assumptions are used.  
Facilitating formal participation requires investments in better communication as well as building 
credibility and legitimacy [104]. A range of tools, such as citizen science, role play, serious games, 
and decision theaters have been adopted in A-S-H modeling to understand actor responses to 
different environmental states and also educate them about the biophysical implications of their 
actions. 
The literature on participatory approaches considers dialogue and communication as the primary 
focus to achieve better collaboration among stakeholders [105]. Participatory processes are 
mainly understood as social or collective learning processes, and many debates in the literature 
point out the limited ability of such dialogical approaches to deal with situations that are too 
coercive [106]. 
Sustainable management deals with the social process leading to an ecological state and with 
these processes comes a need of interventions, including mediation to resolve conflicts, 
facilitation of learning, and participatory approaches that involve people in negotiating collective 
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action. In this context, computer-enhanced modeling becomes a tool for interactive learning 
instead of a tool to pilot the system. 
Companion Modelling (ComMod) [107] is a computer-enhanced participatory modeling 
approach aimed to facilitate exchange among stakeholders involved in a shared problem of 
natural resources management. This flexible approach has been applied since 2000 in several 
cases all over the world. It is based on the iterative co-construction of simulation tools such as 
role-playing games and agent-based models. It aims to integrate multiple stakeholder 
perspectives and to enhance the collective exploration of possible scenarios [105]. The different 
stakeholders, including scientists, work out a common vision on resource management in an 
interactive fashion that would lead to the identification of new alternatives for action.  
 
2.5 Education for Sustainability 
Persuasive communication, education, and involvement of stakeholders are necessary to develop 
sustainable adaptations [108]. Learning is essential for academic and non-academic disciplines 
[10]. There is an intricate relationship between the research, teaching material, management 
practices, and policies [109]. In the modern world, where science, technology, and society are 
tightly interwoven, all stakeholders must learn sustainable practices and make informed 
decisions. Social learning is defined as a change in understanding that goes beyond the individual 
to become situated within wider social communities through social interactions between actors 
within social networks [110]. This theory mediates learning between stimulus and response. 
These cognitive processes allow for individuals to learn new behaviors from others through 
observation [6].  
The positive pedagogical impact of experiments has already been documented [111]. By having 
diverse stakeholders get involved in the kind of decision-making challenges, we can engage them 
in exploring the difficulties that other stakeholders face in their daily lives, illustrate the human 
biases and difficulties for making choices when it comes to trade-offs between the present and 
the future, others and self, or the difference between valuing gains and losses.  
 
2.5.1 Experiential Learning 
According to Kolb [112], experience plays an important role in the learning process. Participatory 
experiments or games expose participants to different learning moments that cater to different 
learning styles [113]. Participants are exposed to the Kolb’s experiential learning four-stage cycle 
[112]: 
1. Concrete Experience: participants experience the behavior, different levels of influence 
and potentially conflicting interests of stakeholders involved in a simulated system, 
representative of real-life context in many instances; 
2. Reflective Observation: participants reflect on the outcome and on the challenges they 
faced. 
3. Conceptualization: participants identify the challenges discuss the need for 
stakeholders' collaboration and test participants knowledge 
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4. Active Experimentation: participants practice the concepts they learned in a simulated 
integrated system, with the potential to further practice later in real-life situations. 
With the use of participatory learning approaches, like serious games, the process of acquiring 
knowledge is enhanced through active practical engagement, socializing, cooperation, repetition, 
and reflection. 
 
2.5.2 Serious Games 
Making science more accessible and interesting to the public through the process of gamification 
has become increasingly popular in recent years [114]. The idea of using games for purposes 
other than fun was first formulated in the book Serious Games (Figure 7) by Clark C. Abt [115] as 
games for educational purposes that are not intended to be played primarily for amusement 
[116, 117].  
 
Figure 7: Objectives and applications of serious games. 
The design of serious games follows the approach of Triadic Game Design introduced by 
Harteveld [118]. This approach involves a triad consisting of the interdependent worlds of reality, 
meaning, and play that has to be balanced out during the design process [119]. Studies have 
indicated that board games are useful learning tools because participants are playing face-to-face 
and employing specific mechanisms (strategy, cooperation, lying, betrayal) to win. According to 
previous literature [120], educational board game developers have emphasized knowledge 
transmission because they possess the following features simultaneously: role-play simulations, 
goal orientation, procedural rules, feedback mechanisms, player interactions, and repeated 
process rounds.  
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Figure 8: Classification of serious games. 
Based on the learning objectives, serious games are designed in many different forms and can 
be played in various techniques (Figure 8). Setting aside genre and narratives, the application of 
games in a transdisciplinary system focuses on (i) research and collecting information, (ii) learning 
by practicing and analyzing, and (iii) fostering a change in the target groups’ attitude [121].  
 
Metric 
Type of learning 
Traditional E-learning Serious games 
Implementation Moderate Low High 
Cost High Low Moderate 
Proficiency High Low High 
Confidence Moderate Low High 
Retention Moderate Moderate High 
Debriefing High Moderate High 
Economic impact High Low High 
Level of Engagement High Low High 
Table 2: Learning advantages of serious games. 
 
Serious games have become an important tool for participatory research approaches [122] and 
provide A-S-H studies with a tool to engage with the community in an entertaining, engaging 
manner, which in turn triggers a process whereby the community and the organization learn and 
move towards solutions together [96]. The impact of serious games in education [123] (Table 2) 
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have consistently revealed positive effects on promoting motivation and participation, on 
exercising creativity, and on forming an environment for multi-criteria skill development.  
A recent review by Madani [124] provided an overview of game-based learning and the state of 
serious games for environmental management, offering insight into their potential as effective 
tools in facilitating environmental education. Game-based approaches for water governance aim 
to facilitate understanding of the overall complexity of the real world; foster stakeholder 
collaboration, cross-sectoral integration, and/or multi-stakeholder dialogue; experiment with 
multiple scenarios in a safe trial environment, and facilitate social learning [125]. 
 
2.6 Summary of Research Gaps 
The review of available research and methodologies, several potential research gaps in analyzing 
and optimizing the resilience of A-S-H networks. These research gaps mainly involve the 
incorporation of human-water dynamics and the conflicting multi-objective from the components 
of the network (sustainable management vs profitable outcomes).  
In order to develop sustainable water resources management for agriculture, it is necessary to 
include the participation of stakeholders in the modeling process. While complex computational 
frameworks like ABM and game theory models have been the focus of sustainability research 
lately, little development has been done toward the integration of transdisciplinary expertise into 
these models.  
Innovative participatory approaches, like serious games, show a potential opportunity to enhance 
social learning. Social learning is the primary objective of science co-production that depends on 
three conditions [126, 127] (i) integration with stakeholders in all phases of research, (ii) 
transdisciplinarity, which in turn depends on scientists’ willingness and low institutional barriers, 
and (iii) the creation of usable science that directly reflects expressed stakeholder needs and 
should be understandable, available, and accessible at the times and places to the community. 
 










3. Irrigation Optimization in The US Corn Belt 
Simulation-based studies of irrigation management often don't consider the variability of 
important climate parameters within different temporal scales. These studies mostly focused on 
only rainfed sites or only irrigated sites with assumptions of full-field capacity irrigation.  
Current research gap highlights the need for multidisciplinary simulations where different 
irrigation management strategies for optimized crop production are compared and assessed 
within different climate variability scenarios. Therefore, based on the projected changes in water 
resources availability and the potential of implementation of irrigation technologies in the intense 
agricultural region in the US known as the Corn Belt, the objective of this study was to understand 
the variability of key hydroclimatic parameters (i.e. temperature, precipitation, and 
evapotranspiration) at different temporal scales and to evaluate diverse irrigation strategies with 
their respective optimizers for several locations across the Corn Belt. For this study, the complex 
network approach focused on an interdisciplinary Agro-Hydrological (A-H) network. Figure 9 
shows the experimental design implemented in this study. 
 
Figure 9: Applied experimental design. 
 
3.1 Agriculture in The Corn Belt 
The Corn Belt (Figure 10) is a region in the US Midwest that consists of the states of Iowa, Illinois, 
Indiana, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, South Dakota, North Dakota, Ohio, Wisconsin, 
and parts of Michigan and Kentucky. The Corn Belt is known for the ideal climate and soil 
conditions for crop production and intense farming characterized by perfect soil and climatic 
conditions [128]. Hence, it has dominated the corn production in the US and settles the US as the 
largest corn producer in the world. The Corn Belt region is comprised of two large basins, the 
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Upper Mississippi River Basin and Ohio-Tennessee River Basin, which are considered the key 
contributing areas for the Northern Gulf of Mexico's hypoxic zone. Thus, in this area, it is of utmost 
importance to ensure that intensive agriculture can coexist with a sustainable water environment 
[129].  
 
Figure 10: Map of the US Corn Belt with current irrigated area and location of study sites. 
Agricultural production in the Corn Belt is becoming increasingly complex and challenging in the 
face of a rapidly changing climate and the need to balance growing crop productivity with 
environmental protection [130]. For agricultural producers in arid regions of the Western Corn 
Belt, water for irrigation represents a major constraining resource. In response, agricultural 
producers who depend on irrigation have sought solutions that optimize the value obtained from 
increasingly limited irrigation water [131]. 
In this study, county-level data of corn yield and climatic variables for 17 spatially representative 
sites were evaluated within the Corn Belt. The data was collected from the National Agricultural 
Statistics Service annual surveys. Because this study focuses on the impacts of climate variability, 
the yield data were restricted to and detrended from the 30 years averaged yield of each county 
to decrease the influence of technological changes. The on-site station daily meteorological data 
for these 17 counties were obtained from the National Climatic Data Center [132]. Climate records 
for 2041–2070 were projected using the bias-corrected model combination MM5I + HadCM3 
[133]. The performed simulations aimed at (i) characterizing the prospective climate and irrigation 
implementation in the Corn Belt; (ii) evaluating seven irrigation management strategies, ranging 
from no irrigation to optimized deficit irrigation; and (iii) finding optimal irrigation for each one of 
the 17 studied sites.  
3.2 Historical and Prospective Climatic Variability 
Eastern Corn Belt: Baraboo, Beloit, Marysville, Toledo, Huntington, Rensselear, Dekalb, and Tuscola 
3. Irrigation Optimization in The US Corn Belt 
29 
Month April May June July August September 
Time Series H F H F H F H F H F H F 
P 
Max 9.79 9.95 12.25 7.87 14.73 6.75 15.14 6.98 13.14 5.56 10.39 5.34 
Average 1.86 2.05 1.90 1.34 1.66 1.32 1.20 1.33 1.10 1.46 1.24 1.39 
Min. 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.14 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.15 
ET 
Max 3.87 5.27 4.92 5.38 5.73 4.87 5.90 3.87 5.24 2.97 4.19 2.30 
Average 2.78 4.42 3.81 4.45 4.68 3.95 4.86 2.97 4.23 2.14 3.30 1.58 
Min. 1.89 3.12 2.64 3.13 3.49 2.68 3.69 1.79 3.19 1.21 2.44 0.77 
T 
Max 20.46 28.59 25.72 27.75 30.28 25.03 31.68 19.82 30.93 15.42 27.80 12.35 
Average 9.80 19.31 15.69 18.34 21.01 15.66 22.99 11.00 21.97 6.95 17.79 4.29 
Min. -0.47 9.70 5.49 9.05 11.07 6.48 13.46 2.36 12.15 -1.40 7.00 -3.45 
Western Corn Belt: Brooking, Columbus, Olivia, Rochester, Grand Forks, Iowa City, Kirksville, New Madrid, and 
Topeka 
P 
Max 11.90 11.76 16.12 10.08 19.54 9.33 17.78 7.55 16.83 6.32 14.43 5.53 
Average 0.82 1.11 0.92 0.79 0.95 0.68 0.52 0.60 0.48 0.75 0.60 0.62 
Min. 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.02 
ET 
Max 4.03 5.82 5.09 6.04 5.48 5.48 6.09 4.50 5.48 3.65 4.35 2.97 
Average 2.85 4.62 3.89 4.65 4.17 4.17 4.99 3.14 4.34 2.29 3.26 1.72 
Min. 1.77 3.27 2.57 3.19 3.26 2.69 3.58 1.85 3.09 1.22 2.16 0.81 
T 
Max 23.56 31.54 28.24 31.18 32.45 28.24 34.41 23.27 34.01 19.46 30.19 16.40 
Average 8.93 17.96 14.58 17.38 19.34 14.94 21.44 10.32 20.41 6.83 15.93 4.20 
Min. -1.73 9.36 4.70 8.83 10.73 6.01 13.16 0.90 11.82 -2.96 6.11 -5.42 
H = Historical Time Series (1981 - 2010), F = Future Time Series (2041 - 2070), P = Precipitation, ET = 
Evapotranspiration, T = Temperature 
Table 3: Hydroclimatic variability in the Corn Belt. 
 
The recorded climate data for 1981-2010 was evaluated and compared them to projected data 
for 2041-2070. Additionally, the recorded irrigation in the studied sites was analyzed. The majority 
of the sites (Table 3) show increasing trends in temperature in the early season, with average 
annual temperatures increasing over the last several decades and a shift in seasons with an 
earlier winter and shorter spring. This shift has led to increased crop transpiration in mid-season 
and longer growing season dates by around 12 days more than it was a century ago. A slight 
increase of 5-10% of the average rainfall was found, especially in the mid-season. Additionally, an 
increase in the amount of short intense rainfall (i.e., flash floods) was found that could severely 
impact crop production at any stage of the growing season. Previous studies [134] infer that 
climate change would increase irrigation water consumption by 19% while corn yields would 
decrease by 7%. Projected 2041–2070 growing season precipitation indicated increased growing 
season dryness due to rising temperatures and solar radiation. Consequently, as growing season 
water scarcity becomes more frequent, irrigation systems will provide a viable climate adaptation 
strategy for agricultural production. 
 
3.3 Simulated Irrigation Strategies 
The simulations were based on the decision support tool for Optimal Climate Change Adaption 
Strategies in Irrigation (OCCASION) [32] that assess limited irrigation systems and the impact of 
climate variability and derive site-specific stochastic crop-water production functions (SCWPFs). 
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The stochastic crop‐water production functions offer advantages over traditional aggregate 
empirical models when seeking to model the impact of risk preferences on irrigation demand. 
 


















Rainfed No water application to be used as a reference for 
the lowest limit of yields 
Full supplemental irrigation Application of a predefined amount of water when 
the soil water deficit is near full capacity. 
Simple Deficit irrigation Application of a predefined amount of water when 
the soil water deficit is below a threshold and serves 
as a reference for the other optimized deficit 
irrigation strategies.  
Constant supplemental 
irrigation  
Applies a fixed depth of water for a fixed irrigation 
















Deficit irrigation with decision 
table  
A closed-loop irrigation control based on information 
about the available water and the water deficit in the 
soil. The optimizer was implemented using the 
Evolution Strategy with Covariance Matrix Adaptation 
(CMA-ES) [135]. 
Deficit irrigation with a decision 
table and phenological stages  
Implements a modified decision table based on the 
crop response to water stress at the specific 
phenological stages throughout the growing season 
using CMA-ES.  
Deficit irrigation with GET-OPTIS  An open-loop irrigation control that implements a 
general irrigation calendar for all growing seasons of 
the considered time series.  
Table 4: Evaluated irrigation strategies. 
 
The implemented framework consists of: (i) a future and historic climate scenario; (ii) the Soil-
Water Balance (SWB) model, which was used to estimate the irrigation system during the growing 
season and the yield response of maize to the considered irrigation management strategies; and 
(iii) seven irrigation strategies with the specific algorithm for optimal irrigation scheduling with 
limited water supply. The estimated SCWPFs, which are empirical probability functions where for 
every volume of applied irrigation water and the specific yield that can be achieved. The irrigation 
strategies evaluated are shown in Table 4.  
 
3.4 Optimal Irrigation Strategies Throughout the Corn Belt 
The main idea was to qualitatively compare the seven irrigation management strategies. Figure 
11 shows the results of the optimal irrigation strategies for four different initial soil moisture.  
To summarize the main findings: (i) constant supplemental irrigation showed an improvement in 
yield and small water savings only in wet soil conditions (i.e., above 30% initial soil moisture); (ii) 
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the decision tables and GET-OPTIS optimizers showed better results within all the studied sites 
and when compared to non-optimized irrigation strategies; (iii) GET-OPTIS showed better results 
for wet soil conditions with higher precipitation variability and the Decision Tables performed 
better for dry soil conditions with high precipitation variability; (iv) in all locations, stochastic 
variability between years showed to be higher at low levels of irrigation, which was improved by 
GET-OPTIS and Decision Tables optimizers.  
 
Figure 11: Optimal irrigation strategies for the predicted climate variability. 
Irrigation may become a relied-upon a strategy to mitigate potential corn production losses 
across the Corn Belt, which will impact previously unaffected watersheds and groundwater 
resources. Irrigation has been adopted primarily in the western states (Kansas, Nebraska, South 
Dakota, and North Dakota). The results showed that optimized deficit irrigation, especially with 
the decision table optimizers, would be a potential solution for water scarcity impact in agriculture 
in these states. Although irrigation technology will not assist with the potential flooding events 
that could occur more frequently, these systems may provide more stability in the water 
availability to crops under a more uncertain future climate. Recent studies [30] have shown that 
irrigation, in general, is expected to remain an unprofitable investment in some of the wettest 
locations across the Corn Belt, such as eastern Ohio and in Minnesota, and in Iowa, where some 
of the most fertile soils are located.  
 
3.5 Summary 
Identifying irrigation strategies to improve agricultural water use has a pivotal role to play in 
agricultural innovation development and implementation towards A-S-H network optimization 
and sustainable water resources management. In this study, the climate variability in the Corn 
Belt was evaluated and diverse irrigation scheduling strategies were assessed focusing on deficit 
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irrigation, to find the optimal irrigation strategy for the possible future changes. Two optimizers 
for deficit irrigation showed positive outcomes in case of new irrigation techniques are to be 
implemented that will help sustainable water management.  
The expansion of irrigation will only take place if commercial, legal, and economic circumstances 
warrant it. Nevertheless, the evaluation of these non-environmental factors is a good subject for 
future inquiry. A-S-H innovation in irrigated agriculture, and by extension, the findings in this 
study, will be greatly influenced by climate variability and farmers' decision making. Human 
agency, hydrological processes, and hydraulic variables create irrigation together. Combined 
modeling of interactions between human agency and water fluxes will increase the 
understanding of irrigation systems, and how they emerge from socioeconomic and 
environmental contexts [136].  
The adoption of the proposed strategies at regional scales or the farm level will be greatly 
influenced by farmers’ objectives, methodological limitations, and financial constraints. Irrigation 
scheduling can be a complex decision-making process, as it is dependent on several factors, 
including, but not limited to, knowledge of crop water requirements and yield responses to water, 
the constraints to and specifics of farm management and agricultural practices, and the 
limitations (financially and technically) of farmers to adopt and implement viable solutions. The 
seven irrigation strategies evaluated in this study have their associated merits and limitations and 
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4. Participatory Analysis of A-S-H Dynamics 
As described in the previous study, water crises that farmers and society in general are 
experiencing, are becoming more complex. As such, they require a more integrated approach in 
managing water resources that links to different sectors of society. Socio-hydrology is developing 
an understanding of the interactions and feedback between natural, technical and social 
processes. This new discipline considers society as an endogenous part of the water cycle and 
studies not only the impact of people on the water but also of water on people.  
The most frequent socio-hydrology approaches are multi-objective models in which variables 
depicting human behavior interact with hydrological variables. Several steps have already been 
taken to facilitate the inclusion of behavior theories from multiple disciplines into hydrological 
simulations.  
One of the most recent is the framework of Modeling Human Behavior (MoHuB) [71] (Table 5), 
which analyzed the implementation of common behavior theories and proposed a framework to 
implement and compare these theories in socio-ecological models.  
 
Behavior Theory Key Assumptions 
Homo Economicus (HE)  Actors’ goal is self-interested utility maximization and have 
perfect knowledge and unlimited cognitive capacity for 
calculating outcomes.  
Bounded Rationality Theory (BR)  Actors are goal-oriented, self-interested, and may have 
cognitive limitations, incomplete or uncertain information 
about the world, and limited time. 
Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB)  Actors’ behavior is mediated by intentions and perceived 
behavioral control. Intentions are based on attitudes, 
subjective norm, and control beliefs. 
Habitual Learning Theory (HL) Actors’ behavior is initially deliberate, and goal directed. 
Repeatedly obtaining satisfactory rewards reinforces the 
behavior. The actor will stop automatic behavior if need 
satisfaction drops below a critical level.  
Descriptive Norm Theory (DN) Actors’ behavior changes by observing the behavior of 
others. Observation can take place in an almost 
subconscious manner or can be more deliberately 
processed. 
Prospect Theory (PT)  Actors have a degree of risk aversion, whereby actors bias 
decisions towards avoiding loss over chancing a gain. 
Table 5: Description of MoHuB theories. 
 
Integrating these theories into hydrological models is challenging due to a lack of data for model 
development and parameterization. A way to collect data and validate these behavior theories is 
to conduct scenario analysis that incorporates quantitative and qualitative information.  
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Optimal irrigation scheduling is considered an efficient strategy to improve water productivity in 
an A-S-H network. The previous study provided a framework to help farmers and researchers in 
the US Corn Belt finding an optimal irrigation strategy during the expected water scarcity 
episodes. Nevertheless, the main limitation of a previous interdisciplinary study was that the 
farmers' decision-making was not taken into account. The objective of this study was to develop 
a transdisciplinary methodology to collect data regarding the human-water dynamics in 
agriculture, and thus this complex network approach focused on a theoretical socio-hydrological 
(S-H) network.  
This study focused on the development and evaluation of a serious board game to analyze socio-
hydrological dynamics towards collaboration in agriculture. The main objective of the study was 
to evaluate the serious board game, MAHIZ, for two purposes: (i) as an innovative and enjoyable 
approach for the general public and (ii) as a data collection method for decision-making processes 
which can inform socio-hydrological models. 
 
4.1 Decision-Making Processes in A-S-H Networks 
 
Figure 12: Representation of decision-making processes in socio-hydrology. 
There is a data gap regarding the social aspects of the decision-making [69] (Figure 12) and also 
regarding the hesitations of traditional hydrology researchers to explore and implement more 
complex decision-making processes. Improvements in current water resources management 
strategies depend on an in‐depth understanding of the drivers behind the water use practices of 
stakeholders [50]. In most simulations, decision-making processes are implemented as settings 
of exogenous variables or parameters and are not endogenous to the model. In multidisciplinary 
behavioral economics, the focus has been heuristics and biases, and the framing of decisions 
[137]. The recent MoHuB framework by Schülter et al. [71] identified the most common behavior 
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theories and defined their main concepts by decomposing the decision-making process within an 
individual into three major parts perception, behavior, and rules. Most decision-making theories 
require high-quality social data that represent the behavioral factors and the dynamics between 
the social and environmental factors that form the behavior. 
 
4.1.1 Collaborative and Participatory Data Collection Approaches 
A possible way to link socio-hydrology to sustainability science is to conduct scenario analysis with 
the engagement of stakeholders. Scenario analysis is a planning methodology, which 
incorporates quantitative (modeling) and qualitative (narrative) information to generate possible 
futures. It provides opportunities for communication to improve public appreciation of science 
and natural resources since that it can include a set of possible and important uncertainties in 
the system rather than relying on accurate prediction of a single outcome. In that sense, scenarios 
can be powerful tools to replace more traditional methods of data collection and to introduce 
concepts such as resilience in the A-S-H network.  
 
Figure 13: Participatory modeling using ComMod approach. 
Narratives are commonly used as data in anthropology, but may not be perceived as valuable 
data by more traditional hydrology, while data collected via remote sensors might be considered 
big data source by modelers, but out of context by a typical social science [40]. 
A common methodology that has gotten a lot of attention lately is the ComMod approach (Figure 
13). This approach involves stakeholders in the adaptive development and evaluation of the 
model's decision-making process. The combination of model simulation and role-playing games 
is frequently applied. Role-playing games are designed to make use of the simulation and to 
collect information from the stakeholders and exploring alternatives. The rules and structures of 
the role-playing games are usually simple to promote player understanding, while the simulations 
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go into more details. The ComMod approach was implemented in the development of this serious 
board game. 
4.2 MAHIZ 
4.2.1 Serious Game Development 
 
Figure 14: MAHIZ prototype and the conceptual agrohydrological scenario represented. 
A euro-style board game named MAHIZ (Figure 14) was developed that provides a feedback 
mechanism that allows the player to reflect on their actions and adopt different strategies, 
stimulates learning, and knowledge retention. MAHIZ offers the opportunity to experience 
diverse integrated approaches to groundwater management and irrigation strategies. The board 
game is a scenario analysis of a complex network that has unexpected, dynamic, evolving 
conditions, and increases the participants' awareness of the context of uncertainty in 
environmental and decision-making processes. An important challenge in managing common-
pool resources is how to ensure collective action to maintain the resource at a sustainable level 
while preventing individuals in privileged positions from taking advantage of the general effort. 
The scenarios in MAHIZ, like the drought or flood scenario, were aimed to reflect situations that 
could occur in real-life and to surprise participants. Experiencing such a setback has been shown 
to intensify participants’ engagement in a game, causing them to more easily remember events 
and eventually relate them to real-life situations, promoting social learning. MAHIZ rulebook can 
be found in the Appendix D. 
An in-depth monitoring and analysis scheme was used to evaluate the level of active participation 
and to identify key factors that influence collective action, as expressed indirectly and safely in a 
gaming context. This scheme consisted of:  
1. Post-game surveys; 
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2. Quantitative and qualitative analysis of communication, trust, and competence during 
and after the game; 
3. Post-game group discussion; 
4. Association analysis of data collected regarding behavior theories and social parameters; 
 
4.2.2 Implementation of Serious Game Sessions 
From April to December 2019, 35 game sessions (Figure 15) were carried out in Germany, Austria, 
Czech Republic, Mexico, and the US and to a broad range of expertise of the real agrohydrological 
system and academic backgrounds participated, from stakeholders (i.e., farmers and managers), 
observers (i.e., researchers, students, and model developers), and board game developers and 
aficionados. 
 
Figure 15: MAHIZ sessions. 
The main goal of this serious board game was for hydro-science students and researchers to learn 
and experiment with the diversity of human behavior, thus develop more complex agrohydrology 
theories and simulations. Additionally, the game aimed to be an intervention tool to (i) raise 
traditional hydrology researchers and teacher’s awareness of the research gap of the lack of 
variable human decision-making representation in optimization models and to (ii) raise board 
game developers and aficionado’s awareness of the multiple uses of board games in academia 
and as outreach. 
After the game session, players participated in a debriefing where the design of the game and 
rationality behind their game strategy is discussed. A sample of the feedback form that player 
filled out is shown in Appendix D.  
4. Participatory Analysis of A-S-H Dynamics 
40 
In most of the game sessions, players learned something new and generated new ideas for 
agrohydrological simulations as well as other environmental problems that can be analyzed 
through serious games. This data and observations allowed us to evaluate the learning process 
of the participants. 
MAHIZ was facilitated by a game master who was in charge of introducing the game, controlling 
time management, and promoting a lively and engaging atmosphere. Other tasks that need to be 
covered by the facilitating team include: collecting player’s post-game surveys, data entry using a 
dedicated computer interface, feeding back results to players, and keeping track of the nature 
and verbatim of interactions between players. The game ends with a discussion on various 
aspects of the game, particularly comparing the outcomes of each of the players. Additionally, the 
connection between players and their respective influence factors were discussed, as well as the 
rationale, interactions, and processes behind the group’s decisions on agricultural management.  
During the development of the methodology, the initial rounds were found to be the most 
important to observe. When the participants play the game several rounds, they develop more 
informed decision strategies. Because the main objective is to elucidate decision mechanisms as 
close as possible to reality in an A-S-H scenario (i.e., a situation of high uncertainty, high time 
pressure to seize opportunities, and poor understanding of the consequences of the decisions), 
the first and last few rounds of the game sessions were the most important for the evolution of 
player’s comments and debates arising during the game.  
The data collection consisted in two main parts: (i) the evaluation of the learning effectiveness of 
the board game and (ii) the evaluation of the behavior theories, highlighted by the MoHuB 
framework regarding the decision-making process experienced by the players during the game. 
Each player was asked to choose the best-fitted theory to represent the way their decision was 
formed during the game. This evaluation highlighted within the research community the need to 
implement diverse behavior theories in agricultural contexts. 
 
4.4 Evaluation of The Learning Process in Serious Games 
Parameter MAHIZ 
Classification Game for Intervention  
Target Group Researchers and game developers  
Number of participants per game 4 
Repetitions (times played) +30 
Easiness of Play  Easy (90% of participants)  
Length (hours) 1.5 
Entertainment Fun (by 91% of participants)  
New Knowledge Yes (by 71% of participants)  
New Skills  Yes (by 60% of participants)  
Increased creativity  Yes (by 80% of participants)  
Table 6: Learning effectiveness assessment of MAHIZ. 
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The majority of players (Table 6) mentioned that, through the game, they gained a better 
understanding of the importance of stakeholders’ engagement for the successful development 
and implementation of sustainable agricultural management. Many players, especially 
researchers, also mentioned that they would be likely to play this game in the future, to support 
training on the education of sustainability and stakeholder coordination on water management. 
 
Figure 16: Learning style and stages enhanced by MAHIZ. 
The experienced learning process in MAHIZ was form of collaborative learning that happens when 
individuals practice their skills or knowledge to supplement with other players, hence achieving 
the outcome they could not have achieved alone, or to the same quality and quantity. Players 
learned to collaborate, and solve problems through critical thinking and analytical skills. Figure 
16 shows the learning process experienced in MAHIZ. Throughout MAHIZ, players learned by 
abstract conceptualization (i.e., reflection of new scenario and modification of existing concepts) 
and active experimentation (i.e., trial-and-error application the new concepts). The learning 
process starts in concrete experience (i.e., encountering a new situation) and ends in active 
experimentation, were assimilation of knowledge (i.e., concise, rational approach of 
understanding the overall goal) and convergence of collective knowledge (i.e., finding practical 
uses for new ideas and theories) was enhanced.  
The following key characteristics of serious games were found to be necessary for effective 
learning: 
 Open communication: providing sustained and open means for interaction between 
researchers and stakeholders. 
 Minimizing generalizations and fostering common understanding: exploring 
discipline-specific assumptions and identifying the diversity of definitions of broad 
concepts.  
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 Leverage diversity: addressing all points of view in an open, critical way to reveal the 
most effective sustainable solutions.  
 Leverage unpredictability: Transdisciplinary gives space and does not over-constraining 
or control the system.  
 Conscious collaboration: Careful choice of partners for transdisciplinary innovation 
projects and the respective disciplines and bias.  
The lack of rigorous and standardized methods to evaluate collaborative science projects makes 
it difficult to assess the real effectiveness of serious games. While the overall feedback of the 
game sessions was very positive, the long-term knowledge generated from the experience is still 
unknown. Improved evaluation using both qualitative and quantitative methods would support 
meaningful analyses and help the development of future serious games and overall collaborative 
efforts.  
Effective transdisciplinary approaches can make an important contribution to the development 
of this new type of transdisciplinary education which focuses on creating experiences in a fun, 
motivating, and engaging ways. Additionally, the development of new technologies like video and 
mobile games, open many opportunities to develop serious games and citizen science projects 
for a broad public.  
 
4.5 Evaluation of Behavior Theories and Social Parameters 
 
Figure 17: Social factors of collective action. 
Measured decision-making factors – communication, trust, and competence – seemed to be 
positively connected to the smoothness of the trajectory of accumulated additional points.  
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This study finds communication within the game increased the likelihood of groups reaching 
sustainable irrigation levels. Figure 17 shows the factors that affected the level of cooperation in 
the A-S-H network adapted from Ostrom and Walker [138]. 
Association measures are very useful in understanding relations between different parameters 
for developing predictive models. Hence the Goodman and Kruskal’s τ was used, which is an 
asymmetric measure of association between two variables is [139]. As a general guideline, a value 
ranging from 0.1 to 0.4 would be classed as a weak correlation, and anything above 0.5 would be 
regarded as a strong correlation. A value approaching zero indicates the absence of any 
association between two variables [140]. The results (Table 7) show that mechanisms related to 
trust increase the level of cooperation and the range of environmental conditions for which 
cooperation can evolve. Communication and trust were also positively associated and 
competence stimulates the development of goals in the decision-making process meanwhile, the 
leadership of single players conduces to an imposed technology implementation pattern, 
whereas a process led by several people allows for more consensus building and a diversity of 
possible outcomes. 
 
 HE BR TPB HL DN PT CM T CP 
CM - + ++ ++ ++ +  ++ + 
T + + ++ + - + ++  + 
CP ++ ++ ++ - + ++ + +  
- : no significant association (0 - 0.39) + : weak association (0.4 - 0.59) ++ : strong association (0.6 - 1)  
T: Trust CM: Communication CP: Competence 
Table 7: Association of social parameters and behavior theories. 
 
4.6 Summary 
Social variables beyond the distribution of water resources and other environmental 
characteristics are necessary to gain a holistic understanding of collective action and innovation 
development and implementation of A-S-H management practices. Modeling human decision-
making in complex natural and human systems remains a combination of science and art and no 
means an easy task [141].  
A serious board game was developed and implemented to learn and teach about the Tragedy of 
Commons in agriculture. Data was collected regarding the main social parameters that formed 
the collaboration strategies in the game. Additionally, the players, especially within the hydrologic 
scientific community, showed an improvement in skill and knowledge level regarding 
transdisciplinary approaches that are effective social learning techniques. However, attention 
should be paid to the equifinality (alternative ways of attaining the same outcome) and multi-
finality (attaining alternative outcomes from the same inputs) nature of the theoretical A-S-H 
simulated in MAHIZ. This analysis indicated the key advantages of MAHIZ, including open 
communication, leverage diversity, and collective action. The results show that irrigation behavior 
exhibits complex nonlinear responses to changes in groundwater availability.  
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A wider adoption of collaborative methods is encouraged, both qualitative and quantitative, as 
well as integrating spatially explicit data and real-time decisions from stakeholders. Doing so will 
further the understanding of coupled natural and human systems in general, and specifically, 
help address social conflicts that may arise with the increasing environmental changes. 
  









5 Robust Evaluation of Decision-Making Processes In A-S-H 
Networks 
As described in the previous chapters, water users are pro-social agents, who have self-awareness 
about their impact on the environment, can adjust behavior to the diverse changes, and are 
interconnected through social networks. These interconnections lead to patterns, i.e., 
cooperation or overexploitation, at the aggregate level. Given the inclusion of conflicting self-
governance as an aggregate social process, it is difficult to conduct statistical analysis and obtain 
high-quality predictions. ABMs are an innovative modeling tool where one can make hypotheses 
about the behavioral mechanisms, such as social learning (i.e., learning from others in the same 
social group) and run simulations to test these hypotheses [15] and observe emerging dynamics 
at individual and aggregated levels.  
In this research project, two agent-based models were developed to represent an abstract version 
of a generic spatial common-pool resource system involving social innovation theories and 
diverse behavior theories coupled with established agrohydrological models. With the knowledge 
and data obtained in the MAHIZ's game sessions, these robust frameworks evaluated diverse 
decision-making processes and heuristics in diverse scenarios with data from Kansas, US, and Al 
Batinah region in Oman.  
The complex network approach implemented in this study focused on a broader A-S-H network, 
intending to produce effective sensitivity analysis of diverse management strategies and decision-
making processes to show how participation and collective action is shaped reflected by speed of 
innovation diffusion.  
 
5.1 Innovation in A-S-H Networks 
Agricultural innovations have to be sustainable in economic, ecological, and social terms, to 
provide food for the growing global population. As farmers decide which innovations will be 
implemented in their farms, it is important to understand farmers’ decisions on the adoption of 
multiple agricultural innovations [142]. Previous research (e.g., Knowler and Bradshaw [23] and 
Prokopy et al. [24]) analyzed the adoption of innovation in agriculture. Respectively, these studies 
used a vote-count method to review studies on conservation strategies and best management 
strategies. Nevertheless, these studies focus on local data and specific behaviors and neglect the 
impact of social networks in common-pool resources.  
In terms of studying water scarcity and other extreme climate scenarios, it is relevant to consider 
the possibilities of agents changing their behavior and the adaptation of specific innovation, 
which results in changes in social resilience [81]. In the developed models it is assumed that 
agents can change their behavior in two ways: 
1. Formation of public opinion based on the memories and interactions with other agents.  
2. Adaptation to extreme climate events. 
The following ABMs were based on a cooperative game a la Shapley [143] (i.e., stochastic game 
where agents act according to strategic rationale, and when their adaptation is driven by diverse 
behavioral factors) to describe how farmers affect their social network, and how the innovation 
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of new irrigation strategies is diffused. In these models, farmers make seasonal adjustments to 
their irrigation strategies while observing changes in others' behavior. Additionally, the innovation 
diffusion process was simulated by considering the agents' variances of benefits as barriers to 
adoption. The variances associated with new strategies change as neighbors, friends, and 
members of the same collective adopt the strategies. Implementation of innovation occurs when 
an agent’s variance of a new strategy is sufficiently reduced, making it worth the risk of adoption.  
 
5.1.1 Multilevel Social Networks 
The social network structure is the key to information dissemination and innovation [144]. An 
innovation network is a social network with specific meanings and objectives for knowledge 
sharing [145]. The agents in an innovation network are connected in diverse levels, e.g., 
friendships, neighborhoods, and collectives (Figure 18). Each level of their social networks impacts 
their accumulation of knowledge and skill level and thus the implementation of innovation [146]. 
Recent SNA studies have focused on the relationship between innovation network structure and 
the level of innovation achieved within the network. Previous research by Verspagen and Duysters 
[147] confirmed that innovation networks based on a strategic collaboration have the small-world 
property. Therefore, innovation networks can achieve a solution in which resources are allocated 
optimally [148].  
 
Figure 18: Multilevel social network in A-S-H systems. 
Previous studies [72] show the structure and effectiveness of the social networks are informative 
of the groundwater-usage behavior. At a local level, agents positively react to connected agents 
sustainably using the resources. Understanding the rules that govern how multilevel social 
networks are structured, how quickly information is communicated and the kinds of relationships 
that networks embody are important aspects of the A-S-H network. Empirically measuring 
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strategic interactions is difficult because identifying the relevant set of a complete social network 
that a farmer responds to is nearly impossible, and it is hard to distinguish strategic effects from 
confounding factors.   
 
5.1.2 Theoretical Framework of Developed ABMs 
Generally, ABMs explicitly consider the limited knowledge of agents about their environment and 
let agents take their decisions based on expectations rather than on actual values of key 
parameters. Previous research [149] suggest that an optimal A-S-H model is not necessarily the 
one that incorporates all possible variables and factors, but rather, the simplified model whose 
findings would remain robust to the inclusion of such additional factors.  
Both ABMs were developed in GAMA, version 1.8.1 [150] and the implementation code for each 
ABM is shown in (Appendix A). The interactions in the models take place on a theoretical social 
network using a random network generator where each edge between a pair of nodes has a fixed 
probability of being present or absent. The random network was generated by Erdős–Rényi [151] 
model which assigns an equal probability for every possible edge in a determined level of the 
social network to occur independently. For each level, there was a different probability.  
 
 
Figure 19: General framework of developed ABMs. 
The developed ABMs (Figure 19) contain various mechanisms for collective action based on 
communication, trust, and competence. These mechanisms shape the resilience of the system 
depending on the different management strategies, diverse decision-making theories, and 
various environmental shocks (i.e., increase of irrigation costs, water scarcity, and saltwater 
intrusion) which allows measuring whether and how fast the agent population can recover from 
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these shocks. Additionally, the ABMs work under the Satisficing paradigm with relatively abstract, 
predefined decision strategies. Agents that are not satisfied with their current strategy start the 
innovation diffusion process. An agent considers adopting an innovation only if the benefits of 
the connected agents in their social network that already adopted and/or is satisfied with the 
innovation is larger than their current benefits (i.e., yield, groundwater, profits, and degree of 
innovativeness). 
 
5.2 DInKA Model: Irrigation Expansion in Kansas, US 
 
Figure 20: DInKA process overview. 
The Diffusion of Innovation in Kansas (DInKA) framework (Figure 20) represents a theoretical 
irrigation network to examine the efficiency and equity outcomes across different management 
strategies. 
Two scenarios (Table 8) were simulated which consisted of diverse management strategies 
commonly assumed in centralized and decentralized approaches due to the impact of the 
interaction. 
The main ABM components of DInKa were:  
1. Agents: 20 farmers as irrigators. It was assumed that all agents are irrigating using the 
full irrigation strategy and they decide to innovate to optimal deficit irrigation depending 
on the hydroclimatic variability and the influence from their social network. 
2. Decision-making processes: As shown in (Figure 20) 
 First step "Closed": the agent assesses the hydroclimatic situation based on the 
aridity index and groundwater level. It was assumed that water scarcity occurs 
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from the 5th year, where the aridity index is below 0.5 and the groundwater level 
reaches a critical level. 
 Second step “Reception”: For the centralized management, 85% of agents start 
their innovation process and directly move to stage 1 (reception). For the rest of 
the network and all agents in the decentralized management, each agent assesses 
their benefits and compares it with the connected agents in their social network. 
If the agent has better benefits than the average of their social network, then the 
agent stays in the current stage (closed). Only when the average benefits of the 
social network are better than the benefits of the agent, they will move to the next 
stage (reception). 
 
Management Centralized Decentralized 
Definition A singular administrator retains total 
control over all communication and 
innovation availability of the network.  
Each agent within the network 
functions as a separate 
administrator with independent 
decision-making power regarding 
how it interacts with other 
agents.  
Advantages Efficiency of the overall system. The 
network environment is stable and 
predictable.  
Better system reliability. Scaling a 
network is also easier.  
Disadvantages Networks are not very fault-tolerant. 
Decisions are made with limited 
knowledge and faulty 
communication.  
The complex and dynamic nature 
makes it extremely difficult to 
build and manage. Same 
outcomes due to different 
reasons. 
Implementation Enforced reception to 85% of all 
agents in the network in year 5. 
Enforced implementation to 35% of 
all agents in the network every year 
after from year 6 to year 20. 
No enforced innovation at any 
time. A random probability (1.5 - 
0.5) affects each agent on their 
calculation of connected agents' 
benefits. 
Table 8: Description of evaluated management strategies and their implementation in DInKa. 
 
 Third step “Implementation”: Once the agent is in the reception stage, the agent 
assesses the innovativeness of their social network, if more than 50% of the 
connected agents are promoting then they move also to implementation if not 
the agent re-assess their benefits and the connected agents' benefits. In the 
decentralized management, the heterogeneity of the communication processes 
was added as a random probability that affected how the agent perceived the 
benefits of other agents. If the agent's benefits are better than the average 
benefits of the social network, then the agent stays in reception. If not, then the 
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agent starts implementing the optimized deficit irrigation strategy reducing the 
groundwater extraction.  
 Fourth step “Promotion”: Once the agent is in the implementation stage, the agent 
assesses their new benefits and compares it with their past benefits. If the new 
benefits are better then the agent moves to promotion. If not, then the agent stays 
in implementation.  
 Fifth step "Satisfaction": Once the agent is in the promotion stage, there is a 
satisfaction assessment where the agent assess their benefits to their past 
benefits (average of 5 years). If the current benefits are better then the agent is 
satisfied. This satisfaction analysis does not affect the innovation process.  
3. Adaptation processes: The farmers' intention and behavior will be determined through 
the satisfying theory and innovation diffusion theory. 30 years of yield, climate (P, T, ET), 
and profit data were used, as well as CWPF from full irrigation and optimal irrigation 
strategy from Topeka, Kansas from the simulations presented in (Chapter 3).  
4. Interaction topology: Interactions directly take place when the agents compare the 
benefits and evaluate their level of satisfaction on the implementation of deficit irrigation 
strategies.  
5. Environment: Multi-level social network with no specific geographical representation.  
The hydrological conditions that determine the need for adaptation were represented by: (i) a 
simple groundwater model [152] was used to estimate a theoretical groundwater level based on 
the extraction of 20 wells and (ii) the aridity index was calculated as the ratio of precipitation and 
evapotranspiration.  
The agent's benefits ( ) were estimated as follow: 
= , , , , ,  (5.1) 
where AI is the aridity index, P is the economic profits of the estimated yield (Y tons/ha), and the 
irrigated water (CWPF mm), GL is the groundwater level (m) after extraction. The connected 
agent's benefits ( ), the new benefits after the implementation of innovation ( ) and the 
previous benefits (  and ) were estimated as follow: 
= ∑   ℎ    (5.2) 
 
=  ,  ,  ,   (5.3) 
 
=    (5.4) 
 
= ∑   5  5  (5.5) 
 
For the decentralized scenario, the variability in communication (CM), i.e., over or underselling of 
the innovation, was aggregated as a random probability (0.5 - 1.5) for each agent: 
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∗ =  ∙  (5.6) 
5.2.1 Robust Analysis of Innovation Diffusion 
Figure 21 shows the innovation stages in each time steps of the simulations. In the first 4 years, 
the agents are learning from the environment and the efficiency of their current irrigation strategy 
(closed stage marked in grey). From year 5, after a period of severe water scarcity, the agents start 
looking for more sustainable irrigation strategies (reception stage marked in blue). As the 
simulations continue, the agents evaluate their production, environmental impact, and influence 
in their social media and decide to implement the innovation (implementation stage marked in 
purple). After this, there is an internal evaluation where the agents access their memory to 
promote (promotion stage marked in brown) and to evaluate their overall satisfaction with the 
new irrigation strategy (satisfied stage marked in red). 
 
Figure 21: Histogram of innovation stages simulated in DInKa. 
The main difference observed from the two scenarios is that the centralized approach showed 
fewer agents implementing the new irrigation management and thus in water scarcity years 
tended to over-exploit the groundwater. Nevertheless, the rate of promotion of the innovation 
was higher than the decentralized approaches. In the centralized approach, the collective action 
(i.e., year where all simulated agents in the reception stage or forwards) was experienced much 
later (year 15) showing that the climate variability impacts the over-exploitation of the resources 
by putting pressure on keeping agricultural production. For the decentralized approach, the 
collective action was reached earlier (year 11) after experienced 4 years of water scarcity, this 
agrees with previous studies [153] that show that memory of extreme rain events (i.e., droughts 
and floods) usually have a 5-year memory time laps in water users. Additionally, the diffusion of 
innovation in the decentralized approach achieved more agents satisfied with the innovation and 
a 100% implementation rate in all simulated agents. 
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This theoretical model is an attempt to answer the question if there is a difference in 
implementation and system resilience when considering different types of management. 
Previous research [18] shows that the centralized management is more efficient nevertheless the 
results show that the users' participation in innovative management practices is critical to achieve 
a sustainable irrigation scenario. Due to faulty information exchange in a centralized scenario, 
the efficiency of implementation is overestimated and can only be realistically estimated by taking 
into account the decision-making process of each agent. 
 
5.3 SAHIO Implementation: Coastal Agriculture in Oman 
 
Figure 22: Geographical representation of the farmer's location. 
Based on the previous framework DInKa, a more complex yet robust ABM framework was 
developed for sustainable A-S-H innovation in Oman (SAHIO) that focused only on a decentralized 
management. This ABM focused on coupling socio-hydrological decision dynamics associated 
with collective action. In this decision framework, each agent controls its strategy regarding 
whether or not to innovate their irrigation strategy to conserve water or consume more water to 
achieve a better economic return based on a baseline allocation scheme. The simulated agents 
were based on the study population consisted of farmers from the Al Batinah region in Oman 
(Figure 22) based on the field interviews by Al Khatri et al. [7] where the underlying social networks 
and processes of the farmers’ behaviors have been analyzed. This helped us identify the 
communication, competence, and trust within the study population.  
SAHIO involved the coupling of diverse A-S-H models (Figure 23). Previous simulations using the 
Deficit Irrigation Toolbox (DIT) [154] and Assessment, Prognoses, Planning, and Management tool 
(APPM) [155] addressed contradicting objectives, i.e., profit-oriented agriculture vs. sustainable 
abstraction and estimated optimized groundwater withdrawal scenarios considering saltwater 
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intrusion. These simulations consisted on 12 farms (300 ha each) in the Al Batinah region and 
optimized the abstraction rate and irrigation strategy for one farmer located at 5800 m from the 
sea with four different sustainability indexes (0.51, 0.52, 0.54, and 0.56) in three policy scenarios: 
1. Baseline scenario: Scenario with 60% irrigation efficiency, full irrigation strategy, and 
only monoculture agriculture. 
2. Water supply policy: Scenario where artificial recharge adds 10 million m3, plus 3 million 
m3 of desalinated water, and 2 million m3 of treated wastewater to the available water, 
there is a restriction of total abstraction by 40 million m3, and still, monoculture 
agriculture is allowed. 
3. Agricultural policy: In addition to the previous scenario, polyculture production is 
enforced.  
 
Figure 23: Model coupling implemented in SAHIO. 
The results of these simulations consisted of, first for the DIT, the CWPF for diverse crops (maize, 
tomato, potato, wheat, sorghum, and sugarcane) based on three different irrigation strategies 
(decision tables, GET-OPTIS, and constant irrigation). Second, the CWPFs obtained with GET-OPTIS 
were used as data for the APPM, where the profits and abstraction rate were optimized based on 
the sustainability index for each of the scenarios. The APPM results (profits, costs, irrigated water, 
groundwater abstraction, and salinity level) of two sustainability indexes were used, which 
represented the two main management strategies, i.e., sustainable abstraction (0.51) and 
profitable abstraction (0.54). SAHIO aimed to complement these complex optimizations by 
analyzing a new scenario where farmers (theoretical representations based on the optimized 
farmer) must decide which abstraction strategy to implement based on the social and biophysical 
environment. To simulate the making of this decision, the six theories in the MoHuB framework 
(Table 4) were evaluated and further implemented the innovation diffusion theory to assess the 
impact of the decision. 
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Figure 24: SAHIO process overview. 
The main ABM components (Figure 24) of SAHIO were: 
1. Agents: 50 farmers as irrigators. It was assumed that all agents are irrigating using a 
profitable abstraction strategy and they decide to change to sustainable abstraction 






Competence Trust Communication 
HE High Efficient Low 
BR High Efficient Efficient 
TPB High 
High for collective and Efficient for 
neighbors and friends. 
High 
HL Low 
Efficient for collective and High for 
neighbors and friends. 
High 
DN Efficient Low High 
PT High 
Efficient for collective and friends and 
Low for neighbors. 
Efficient 
Table 9: Implemented social parameters. 
 
2. Decision-making processes: For scenario policy, the diffusion of innovation for each 
agent followed the same steps as the decentralized management in DInKA, with the 
difference that the water scarcity is triggered also by salinity levels in the groundwater 
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which is based on the theoretical distance from the sea as shown in Figure 22. 
Additionally, 6 different decision processes with specific social parameters, obtained from 
the scenario analysis carried out in Chapter 4, were evaluated as shown in Table 9. The 
decision process for each behavior theory is shown in Appendix B. 
3. Adaptation processes: The simulation time was 60 years with 3-year periods giving in 
total 20 timesteps. Every time step, the farmer assesses their network and based on the 
behavior theory chooses their abstraction strategy. The agent can switch between the 
strategies (i.e., changing from reception to implementation and vice-versa). 
4. Interaction topology: Similar to DInKa. 
5. Environment: Multi-level social network with theoretical geographical representation.  
Each of the policy scenarios (i.e., baseline, water and agricultural policy) were simulated with 
diverse behavior theories and corresponding social parameters to produce a robust sensitivity 
analysis of heterogeneous decision-making processes and its implications on the resilience of the 
A-S-H network.  
Each of the social parameters affects the benefits calculation of each agent and how they 
perceived the benefits of the connected agents in their network. The benefits ( ) were calculated 
as follow: 
= , , , ∙  (5.7) 
 
=  ℎ →   1 − 1.5 → 1 →   0.5 − 1  (5.8) 
 
where GW is the groundwater level (m), SL is the salinity level (δS/m), P is the profits ($), and Y is 
the yield (tons/ha).  
As observed in the scenario analysis in Chapter 4 the agent's competence (CP) affects the way 
they perceived their benefits. When the competence is high, this leads to an overestimation of 
the actual benefits and therefore overexploitation of the resource. when the competence is low, 
the agent believes they are in the worse shape and therefore are more open to looking for new 
strategies. The average benefits of the connected agents ) were calculated as follows: 
= ∑   ℎ   ∙ ∙  (5.9) 
 
=  ℎ →   1 − 1.5 → 1 →   0.5 − 1  (5.10) 
 
 =  ℎ →   1 − 1.5 → 1 →   0.5 − 1  (5.11) 
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where the communication efficiency (CM) and trust levels (TL) affect the way, the agent perceived 
the information from the connected agents. The links between agents do not represent perfect 
knowledge, they represent the amount of information that is available for each agent. The use of 
random probabilities was used to simulate complete heterogeneous agents and imperfect 
knowledge diffusion.  
 
5.3.1 SAHIO Sensitivity analysis  
The results of SAHIO consist of three main evaluations: the innovation rate, groundwater 
abstraction (Figure 25) and profits (Figure 26). The innovation in SAHIO was to change from 
profitable abstraction to sustainable abstraction via collaboration.  
 
Figure 25: Innovation rate and groundwater abstraction using diverse behavior theories. 
Theories that rely in the influence of the social network (theory of planned behavior and 
descriptive norm) had higher rate of implementation due to the diffusion process. While homo 
economicus and bounded rationality are both selfish optimizations, the cognitive limitations of 
bounded rationality have higher impact on the formation of collaboration. However, the policy 
restrictions had no effect on the rate of implementation. In the case of habitual learning, due to 
the not constant satisfaction rate, the agents tend to change back to profitable abstraction, 
leading to low innovation rates.  
Another result of SAHIO is the comparison of static vs dynamic behavior. Static behavior is 
referred to just the sustainable and profitable solutions by the APPM alone. The dynamic results 
indicate the average of the behavior theories using MoHuB.  
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When agents are completely rational, habitual learners (HL), or are willing to risk (PT) tended to 
irrigate more. Whereas the agents with planned rationality (TPB and BR) kept the groundwater 
abstraction more sustainable in all policy scenarios. Agents with the descriptive norm theory 
abstracted the least water due to high influence of the social network.  
 
Figure 26: Comparison of profits obtained in the evaluated policy scenarios. 
For the evaluation of the different policy scenarios (Figure 26), the range of the profits achieved 
by all the diverse behavior theories is shown in grey and showing an average dynamic behavior 
in blue.  
When comparing the policies, the availability of diverse sources of water for irrigation was found 
to increase the profits for the water reformation scenario because the irrigated part of the field 
was almost doubled using the external water sources. The restrictions on the agricultural 
reformation policy led to lower profits because monoculture production was not allowed. This 
policy presents a centralized management, trying to reach an equilibrium between sustainable 
and profitable outcomes.  
The results of the SAHIO show a comparison of the innovation implementation in the simulated 
network. Appendix C shows the variability of innovation implementation achieved with the 
diverse decision-making processes. As observed in the research project presented in Chapter 4, 
the theories dominated by mostly competence (i.e., Homo Economicus and Bounded Rationality) 
show less stochasticity in the diverse scenarios, which highlights the impact of communication 
and trust in the development of collective action. In theories where communication is a 
determinant parameter (Theory of Planned Behavior, Habitual Learning, and Descriptive Norm) 
the sustainable scenarios (Water supply reformation and Agricultural reformation) show 
variability in the innovation process, especially on years with higher water scarcity and higher 
rates of saltwater intrusion (i.e., last 30 years of the simulation). Due to the high variability and 
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randomness of the decision-making process in the Prospect Theory, high stochasticity of the 
results is observed. The climate variability showed to have less impact on the innovation 
implementation in the Descriptive Norm and Prospect Theory, especially in the Agricultural 
Reformation scenario.  
 
5.4 Summary 
The development of ABMs by creating software agents to play the role of irrigation users and 
modeling their interactions with the hydrological cycle is still in development but promises a 
better understanding of irrigation systems as anthropogenic landscapes. Two frameworks DInKa 
and SAHIO were developed to simulate the innovation process of new irrigation strategies like 
deficit irrigation where irrigation has been already applied. These robust frameworks show a 
transdisciplinary approach where participation from stakeholders is enhanced and used for 
sensitivity analysis and predictions.  
In the first framework DInKa, centralized management was compared to a decentralized one and 
observed the aggregated outcome regarding the development of collective action. In the second 
framework SAHIO evaluated diverse decision-making processes and produce a sensitivity analysis 
of innovation implementation, groundwater extraction, and salt-water intrusion which could lead 
to optimal irrigation management policies. These robust frameworks are the first step towards a 
unified modeling of A-S-H systems using the complex network approach. By evaluating how 
heterogeneity characteristics influence the motivations for farmers to engage in conservation 
efforts, a deeper understanding is generated of the conditions under which groundwater 
conservation is likely to be successful. 
  








6 Conclusions and Outlook 
Sustainability is measured as the weighted combination of reliability, resilience, and vulnerability 
measures [156]. This three-part research focused on the understanding of the diversity of this 
combination and was motivated by the following question raised by Di Baldassarre et al [54] 
"Should hydrologists be trying to predict human behavior?". In the past, some prominent 
hydrologists have resisted to any inclusion of complex economic or social components linked to 
hydrologic processes. They were critical of any models you could not calibrate and verify. 
Nevertheless, the predictions of traditional hydrological models have shown to be faulty. This 
highlights the need for more research on complex A-S-H processes and urges the collaboration 
with professionals from other disciplines and stakeholders in a transdisciplinary effort to better 
understand the social, economic, and physical impacts of the future water management 
challenges. 
Simulation and participatory models are important tools for studying how resilience may emerge 
from interactions within a complex A-S-H network. Learning by experimentation and collective 
action was one of the focuses of the presented frameworks to understand the interactions 
between diverse components of the A-S-H networks. The frameworks attempted to combine 
realistic agent learning algorithms, process-based biophysical modules, and empirically 
parameterized decision-making processes. The overall research provides scientific insights to 
inform IWRM by detecting and understanding the relations between physical and social processes 
in an A-S-H network and the impact of water scarcity on these processes. With each project, the 
initial research questions were answered: 
1. How will water scarcity impact agricultural production and what are the optimal irrigation 
adaptation strategies? 
In the first project (Chapter 3), the climate variability in the Corn Belt was evaluated to find the 
optimal irrigation scheduling strategies focusing on deficit irrigation for possible future changes. 
We found that the Corn Belt, previously known for its fertile soil and ideal climate, is experiencing 
climate variations with longer periods of droughts and more high precipitation events. Therefore, 
irrigation is becoming a possible solution. Two optimizers for deficit irrigation showed positive 
water savings and increases in yield in the predicted water scarcity scenarios. 
2. How to collect data regarding the socio-hydrological dynamics in agriculture? 
In the second project (Chapter 4), a serious board game was developed and implemented to 
simulate the complex nonlinear response of irrigation strategies to climate and groundwater 
variability. The data collected gave us a better understanding of the communication, competence, 
and trust processes that generate collective action. The most important outcome of the game 
sessions was that the common economic-based behavior theories used to represent human 
decision-making show a narrow and erroneous representation, highlighting the need for more 
collaboration with social sciences to close this knowledge gap.  
3. How to simulate agro-socio-hydrological networks to optimize agricultural water management 
and evaluate policies impact? 
In the third project (Chapter 5), two frameworks were developed and tested based on innovation 
theories applied to an A-S-H network. In the first framework DInKa, centralized and decentralized 
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management strategies were compared and the aggregated outcome was observed regarding 
the development of collective action. In the second framework SAHIO, diverse decision-making 
processes were evaluated to produce a sensitivity analysis of innovation implementation, 
groundwater extraction, and salt-water intrusion to optimal irrigation management policies. Both 
frameworks implemented theories from different disciplines in a robust and efficient platform, 
where most of the feedback loops between human-water systems are taken into account. While 
both applications are theoretical examples, they give a glimpse of the multiple possibilities of 
knowledge integration using object programming.  
 
6.1 Limitations 
The main challenge of the presented methodologies remains the validation and the analysis of 
uncertainty which hinders the link of the simulated optimization with real-life practices and the 
reproduction of these methodologies beyond its initial objective. Each project had the following 
particular limitations: 
 In the first project (Chapter 3): The user of the optimal irrigation strategies evaluated 
were considered to be homogeneous and static. The social characteristics of these users 
were assumed to be mainly through economic impacts. Nevertheless, these simulations 
help us understand the dynamics between historic and predicted climate and irrigation 
strategies.  
 In the second project (Chapter 4): The game simplifies the hydrological process to 
enhance the social and (theoretical) economic processes that shape the collective action. 
This leads to equifinality and multi-finality which is difficult to separate from the outcomes 
of the game sessions. The evaluation of collaborative games is not standardized yet. All 
the case studies have very different debriefing methods to assess their effectiveness. 
Collaborations are tricky because of the conceptual bias in the disciplines and teaching 
techniques. 
 In the third project (Chapter 5): While the use of diverse social theories in ABMs is 
increasing in literature, this is the first attempted to couple hydrological, agricultural, and 
economic models with innovation and diffusion theories. Therefore, the presented 
frameworks are still preliminary due to the model uncertainty and aggregated bias.  
 
6.2 Outlook 
Collaborative science involves participatory methods that aim to include, consult, and empower 
stakeholders to decrease the gap between researchers, policymakers, and resource users. While 
there is a general agreement that collaborative science or co-production of knowledge is an 
important skill and required for the evolution of science, there is less agreement on how to build 
an assessment to measure it, especially at scale and as a standardized approach. Collaborative 
approaches, especially serious games as shown in have a range of benefits, including the 
development of general communication abilities, empathy, social skills, and better solutions 
through teamwork. For each specific project presented in this study, this future work is 
recommended: 
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 For the first project (Chapter 3): The regionalization of areas surrounding the studied 
sites based on the optimal irrigation strategy with specialized soil and climate data. 
 For the second project (Chapter 4): MAHIZ’s can be adapted for place-based studies to 
explore the decision-making process with local stakeholders to find relevant decision-
making processes and parameters in agrohydrological systems. 
 For the third project (Chapter 5): Combination of theories to better represent deliberate 
decision-making and innovation diffusion.  
Inter- and Trans-disciplinary simulations of interactions between human agency and water 
systems will increase the understanding of irrigation systems as anthropogenic landscapes in 
socioeconomic and environmental contexts. The reliability of these simulations is an important 
factor in identifying irrigation strategies and to improve agricultural water productivity. 
Nevertheless, theoretical implementations are an important element of generating relevant and 
reliable information to further synthesize knowledge effectively and applying it appropriately.  
This research advocate wider adoption of collaborative methods, both qualitative and 
quantitative, as well as integrating explicit data and real-time decisions from stakeholders. Doing 
so will further the understanding of coupled natural and human systems in general, and 
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global schedules: farm + shuffle(farmer) { 
 
int no_farms <- 100; 
float farm_density <- 0.005; 
int neighborhood_distance <-300; 
int no_friends <- 2; 
int collective_distance <- 200; 
int year_innovation <- 5; 
int c_costs <- 300; 
float Ii <- 1.5; 
int Ic <- 70; 
float so_b; 
float happy_im <- 0.5; 
int happy_farmers <- 0; 
float N_trust <- 0.7; 
float F_trust <- 0.9; 
float C_trust <- 1; 
float trust_in_collective <- 0.5; 
float trans <- 0.2; 
string scenario <- "s1"; 






bool display_trust <- false parameter: true ; 
bool display_neighborhood <- false parameter: true ; 
bool display_friendship <- false parameter: true ; 
bool display_collective <- false parameter: true ; 
bool display_icons <- true  parameter: true ; 
bool display_farm <- true  parameter: true ; 
image_file background <- 
image_file("../includes/farm_background.jpg"); 
geometry shape <-square 
((1/farm_density)*no_farms^(1/2)); 
geometry free_space; 
file crop_file <- csv_file("../includes/data.csv", “,”, true ); 
matrix data<- matrix(crop_file); 
 
/*Global - init */  
init { 
if scenario = "s1" { 
farm_density <- 0.003;  




} else { 
farm_density <- 0.005;  




free_space <- copy(shape) - 100; 
create farm number:no_farms { 
location <- any_location_in(free_space); 
free_space <- free_space - (shape + 100);} 
ask farm { 
neighborhood <- farm 
at_distance(neighborhood_distance); 
create farmer { 
my_farm <- myself; 
myself.my_farmer <- self; 
location <- myself.location;}} 
ask farmer { 
friendship <- rnd(0, no_friends) among (farmer - self); 
neighborhood <-  (my_farm.neighborhood collect 
each.my_farmer); } 
ask one_of(farm){ 
my_farmer.in_collective <- true ; 
ask farm at_distance(collective_distance){ 
my_farmer.in_collective <- true ;}} 
ask farmer where(each.in_collective){ 




/*Global - reflex */  
reflex initial_status when: cycle < year_innovation{ 
ask (farmer){ 
innovation_status <- "closed";}} 
reflex innovation_trigger when: cycle = 
year_innovation{ 
ask 3 among (farmer where each.in_collective){ 
innovation_status <- “Implementation”; 
year_implementation <- cycle;}} 
reflex innovation_update when: cycle >= 
year_innovation{ 
ask (farmer){ 
if length(trust_values.keys) = 0{ 
innovation_status <- "closed"; 
}else{ 
if innovation_status = “Implementation” or 
innovation_status = “promotion”{ 
loop linked_farmer over: trust_values.keys { 
if linked_farmer.innovation_status = "closed"{ 
linked_farmer.innovation_status <- “reception”;}}}}}} 
reflex update_variable when: cycle >= year_innovation{ 
so_b <- (count(farmer, each.innovation_status = 
“Implementation”)/length(farmer));} 
reflex benefit_update { 
ask farm{ 
if my_farmer.innovation_status = “closed” or 
my_farmer.innovation_status = “reception”{ 
do initial_calculations;} 
if my_farmer.innovation_status = “Implementation” or 
my_farmer.innovation_status = “promotion”{ 
do new_calculations;} 
mean_Yt <+ (farm mean_of last(each.Yt)); 
mean_Op <+ (farm mean_of last(each.Op)); 
mean_Po <+ (farm mean_of last(each.Po)); 
mean_AI <+ (farm mean_of last(each.AI)); } 
ask farmer { 
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if innovation_status = “closed” or innovation_status = 
“reception”{ 
do initial_benefits_calculation;} 
if innovation_status = “Implementation” or 
innovation_status = “promotion”{ 
do new_benefit_calculation;} 
mean_B <+ (farmer mean_of last(each.B));}} 
reflex save_results { 
save [scenario,cycle,(farmer count 
(each.innovation_status = “Implementation”)), 
(farmer count (each.innovation_status = “promotion”))] 
to: "test.csv" type:csv rewrite: false;} 












geometry shape <- circle(rnd(25, 50)); 
aspect default { 
if display_farm{ 
draw shape color: #white; 
}else { 
draw shape color: #green;}} 
action initial_calculations{ 
farm_area <- shape.area*0.0001; 
Yt <- Yt + [farm_area*float(data[3,cycle])]; 
Op <- Op + [farm_area*c_costs]; 
Po <- Po + [Yt[cycle]*(float(data[4,cycle]))-Op[cycle]]; 
AI <- AI + [(float(data[2,cycle]))/(float(data[1,cycle]))]; 
} 
action new_calculations { 
farm_area <- shape.area*0.0001; 
Yt <- Yt + [(farm_area*float(data[3,cycle]))*Ii]; 
Op <- Op + [(farm_area*c_costs) + Ic]; 
Po <- Po + [Yt[cycle]*(float(data[4,cycle]))-Op[cycle]]; 
AI <- AI + [(float(data[2,cycle]))/(float(data[1,cycle]))];}} 
 
/*Farmer*/ 





bool in_collective <- false; 
bool happy <- false; 
list<float> B; 
int year_implementation; 
rgb color <- #black; 
string innovation_status <- “closed” among: 
["closed”,”reception”, “Implementation”, “promotion”]; 
image_file icon_closed <- 
image_file(“../includes/closed.png”); 
image_file icon_happy <- 
image_file(“../includes/happy.png”); 
image_file icon_implementation <- 
image_file(“../includes/implementation.png”); 
image_file icon_promotion <- 
image_file(“../includes/promotion.png”); 
image_file icon_reception <- 
image_file(“../includes/reception.png”); 
aspect default { 
if display_icons { 
if innovation_status = “closed” { 
draw icon_closed size:pic_size;}  
if innovation_status = “reception” { 
draw icon_reception size:pic_size;} 
if innovation_status = “Implementation” { 
draw icon_implementation size:pic_size;}  
if innovation_status = “promotion” { 
if happy { 
draw icon_happy size:pic_size; 
}else { 
draw icon_promotion size:pic_size;}} 
} else { 
draw circle(7) color: color;}} 
map<farmer,float> trust_values; 
action initialize_trust { 
if in_collective{ 
loop i over: remove_duplicates(neighborhood + 
friendship + collective) { 
float initial_value <- 0.0; 
if i in neighborhood{ 
initial_value <- N_trust;} 
if i in friendship { 
initial_value <- F_trust;} 
if i in collective { 
initial_value <- C_trust;} 
trust_values[i] <- initial_value; } 
} else { 
loop i over: remove_duplicates(neighborhood + 
friendship + collective) { 
float initial_value <- 0.0; 
if i in neighborhood{ 
initial_value <- N_trust;} 
if i in friendship { 
initial_value <- F_trust;} 
if i.in_collective { 
initial_value <- initial_value*trust_in_collective;} 
trust_values[i] <- initial_value; }}} 
aspect links { 
if (display_trust) { 
loop far over: remove_duplicates(friendship + collective 
+ neighborhood) { 
draw line ([location, far.location]) + 
1.5*(trust_values[far]) color: #black;}} 
if (display_neighborhood) { 
loop far over: neighborhood { 
draw line ([location, far.location]) color: #red border: 
#black size:200;}} 
if (display_friendship) { 
loop far over: friendship { 
draw line ([location, far.location]) color: #blue border: 
#black size:200; }} 
if (display_collective) { 
loop far over: collective { 
draw line ([location, far.location]) color: #orange 
border: #black size:200;}}} 
 
/*Innovation stage: Closed */ 
action initial_benefits_calculation { 
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B <- B + (my_farm.Po[cycle]/my_farm.Op[cycle]) + 
(my_farm.AI[cycle]);} 
 
/*Innovation stage: Implementation */ 
action new_benefit_calculation { 
B <- B + [so_b + (my_farm.Po[cycle]/my_farm.Op[cycle]) 
+ (my_farm.AI[cycle])];} 
 
/*Innovation stage: Reception */ 
reflex reception when:(innovation_status = 
“reception”){ 
float R; 
int counter <- 0; 
float happy_coeff; 
loop linked_farmer over: trust_values.keys{ 
if linked_farmer.happy{ 
happy_coeff <-1 + happy_im; 
}else { 
happy_coeff <- 1;} 
R <- R + 
linked_farmer.B[cycle]*(trust_values[linked_farmer]*ha
ppy_coeff); 
counter <- counter + 1;} 
R <- R / counter; 
if B[cycle] < R { 
innovation_status <- “Implementation”; 
year_implementation <- cycle;}} 
 
/*Innovation stage: Promotion */ 
reflex promotion when:(innovation_status = 
“Implementation” and cycle > year_implementation){ 
float P; 
int counter <- 0; 
loop linked_farmer over: trust_values.keys{ 
P <- P + 
linked_farmer.B[cycle]*trust_values[linked_farmer]; 
counter <- counter + 1;} 
P <- P / counter; 
if B[cycle] > P { 
innovation_status <- “promotion”;}} 
 
reflex happy when:(innovation_status = “promotion”){ 
float av_5year <- mean(5 last B); 
if av_5year < B[cycle]{ 
happy <- true ; 
happy_farmers <- happy_farmers + 1;} 
else { 
happy <- false;}}} 
experiment DInKa_batch type: batch repeat:4 
keep_seed: true  until: cycle > 29 parallel: false{ 
parameter “scenario” var: scenario  among: ["s1", 's2'];} 
experiment DInKa type: gui keep_seed: true { 
parameter “transparency” var: trans init:0.2; 
parameter “scenario” var: scenario  among: ["s1", 's2']; 
output { 
display map autosave: true  synchronized: true { 
image background transparency: trans; 
species farm transparency: 0.4; 
species farmer aspect: links; 
species farmer;} 
display “Environment Factors” type: java2D { 
chart “Environmental Factors” type: series  title_font: 
‘SanSerif’ title_font_size: 28.0 label_font: ‘SanSerif’ 
label_font_size: 18 legend_font_style: ‘plain’ 
legend_font: ‘SanSerif’ 
legend_font_size: 18 x_label: “Years” x_serie_labels: 
(1980+(cycle+1)) tick_font_size:15 y_label: “Yield [kg/ha]” 
y2_label: “Aridity Index” y_tick_line_visible: false 
x_tick_line_visible: false{ 
data “Yield [kg/ha]” value: mean_Yt marker_shape: 
marker_circle color: #red; 
data “Aridity Index [-]” value: mean_AI marker_shape: 
marker_circle color: #blue use_second_y_axis: true ;}} 
display “Economic Factors” type: java2D { 
chart “Economic Factor” type: series title_font: ‘SanSerif’ 
title_font_size: 28.0 label_font: ‘SanSerif’ label_font_size: 
18 legend_font_style: ‘plain’ legend_font: ‘SanSerif’ 
legend_font_size: 18 x_label: “Years” x_serie_labels: 
(1980+(cycle+1)) tick_font_size:15 y_label: "$" 
y_tick_line_visible: false x_tick_line_visible: false{ 
data “Profit [$]” value: mean_Po marker_shape: 
marker_circle color: #red; 
data “Operational costs [$]” value: mean_Op 
marker_shape: marker_circle color: #blue;}}  
display “Farmers Benefits” type: java2D { 
chart “Farmers Benefits” type: series title_font: 
‘SanSerif’ title_font_size: 28.0 label_font: ‘SanSerif’ 
label_font_size: 18 legend_font_style: ‘plain’ 
legend_font: ‘SanSerif’ 
legend_font_size: 18 x_label: “Years” x_serie_labels: 
(1980+(cycle+1)) tick_font_size:15 y_label: “Farmer 
Benefits” y_tick_line_visible: false x_tick_line_visible: 
false{ 
data “Benefit [-]” value: mean_B marker_shape: 
marker_circle color: #blue;}}  
display “Status of Farmers” type: java2D { 
chart “Innovation Status of Farmers” type:histogram 
style:stack title_font: ‘SanSerif’ title_font_size: 28.0 
label_font: ‘SanSerif’ label_font_size: 18 
legend_font_style: ‘plain’ legend_font: ‘SanSerif’ 
legend_font_size: 18 x_label: “Years” x_serie_labels: 
(1980+(cycle+1)) tick_font_size:12 y_label: “Number of 
Farmers” y_tick_line_visible: false x_tick_line_visible: 
false{ 
data “Farmers in Closed” value: length(farmer where 
(each.innovation_status = "closed")) 
accumulate_values: true  color: rgb (88, 88, 88,255); 
data “Farmers in Reception” value: length(farmer 
where (each.innovation_status = “reception”)) 
accumulate_values: true  color: rgb (63, 72, 
204,255); 
data “Farmers in Implementation” value: (farmer count 
(each.innovation_status = “Implementation”)) 
accumulate_values: true  color: rgb (139, 56, 183,255); 
data “Farmers in Promotion” value: (length(farmer 
where (each.innovation_status = “promotion”))-
length(farmer where (each.happy = true ))) 
accumulate_values: true  color: rgb (149, 91, 58,255); 
data “Happy Farmers” value: length(farmer where 
(each.happy = true )) accumulate_values: true  color: 









global schedules: farm + shuffle(farmer) { 
 
// Data files 
matrix data; 
file ag_file <- csv_file(“../includes/data_ag.csv”, “,”, true ); 
matrix data_ag<- matrix(ag_file); 
file base_file <- csv_file(“../includes/data_base.csv”, “,”, 
true ); 
matrix data_base<- matrix(base_file);  
file water_file <- csv_file(“../includes/data_water.csv”, “,”, 
true ); 
matrix data_water<- matrix(water_file);  
 
// Farm parameters 
int no_farms <- 50; 
int neighborhood_distance <-0; 
 
// Economical parameters 
list<float> mean_Co;  
list<float> mean_Po;  
 
// Hydrological parameters  
list<float> mean_Irr; 









// Farmer parameters 
int no_friends <- 2; 
int collective_distance <- 200; 
 




float trust_in_collective <- 0.5; 
 
// Satisfaction parameters 
float happy_impact <- 0.7;  
int happy_farmers <- 0; 
list<float> mean_Be; 
 
// Innovation parameters 
int year_innovation <- 3; 
 
// Policy scenarios  
string Policy_Scenario <- “Baseline” among: [“Baseline”, 
“Water_Policy”, “Agricultural_Policy”] parameter: true ; 
 
// Behavior theories parameters 
string Behavior_Theory <- “Homo_Economicus” among: 
[“Homo_Economicus”, “Bounded_Rationality”, 
“Theory_Planned_Behavior”, “Habitual_Learning”, 
“Descriptive_Norm”, “Prospect_Theory”] parameter: 
true ;  
float N_trust <- 0.5; 
float F_trust <- 0.7; 
float C_trust <- 0.9; 
float comm_eff <- 1; 
 
// Display parameters  
float transparency <- 0.0; 
int pic_size <- 750; 
bool Display_trust <- false; 
bool Neighborhood_links <- false parameter: true ; 
bool Friendship_links <- false parameter: true ; 
bool Collective_links <- false parameter: true ; 
bool Farmer_Icon <- true  parameter: true ; 
bool Farm <- true ; 
geometry shape <-square (10000); 
geometry free_space; 
 
/*GLOBAL-INITIALIZATION */  
init { 
// Policy scenarios 
if Policy_Scenario = “Baseline”{ 
data<-data_base;} 
if Policy_Scenario = “Water_Policy”{ 
data<-data_water;} 
if Policy_Scenario = “Agricultural_Policy”{ 
data<-data_ag;} 
// Behavior Theories   
if Behavior_Theory = “Homo_Economicus” { 




N_trust <- 0.0; 
F_trust <- 0.0; 
C_trust <- 0.0; 
comm_eff <- 1.0;  
do action: MoHuB1} 
if Behavior_Theory = “Bounded_Rationality” { 




N_trust <- rnd(0.25,0.5); 
F_trust <- rnd(0.25,0.5); 
C_trust <- rnd(0.25,0.5); 
comm_eff <- rnd(0.7,0.9); 
 do action: MoHuB2} 
if Behavior_Theory = “Theory_Planned_Behavior” { 




N_trust <- rnd(0.5,0.7); 
F_trust <- rnd(0.5,0.7); 
C_trust <- rnd(0.7,0.9); 
comm_eff <- rnd(0.5,0.7);  
do action: MoHuB3} 
if Behavior_Theory = “Habitual_Learning” { 
no_friends <- 7; 





N_trust <- 0.5; 
F_trust <- 0.7; 
C_trust <- 0.9; 
comm_eff <- rnd(0.7,0.8); 
do action: MoHuB4}  
if Behavior_Theory = “Descriptive_Norm” { 




N_trust <- 1.0; 
F_trust <- 1.0; 
C_trust <- 1.0; 
comm_eff <- 1; 
do action: MoHuB5}  
if Behavior_Theory = “Prospect_Theory” { 




N_trust <- rnd(0.3,0.5); 
F_trust <- rnd(0.5,0.7); 
C_trust <- rnd(0.7,0.9); 
comm_eff <- rnd(0.5,0.6); 
do action: MoHuB6}  
 
// Farm and farmer creation  
free_space <- copy(shape)-400; 
create farm number:no_farms { 
location <- any_location_in(free_space); 
free_space <- free_space - (shape + 500);} 
ask farm { 
neighborhood <- farm 
at_distance(neighborhood_distance); 
create farmer { 
my_farm <- myself; 
myself.my_farmer <- self; 
location <- myself.location;}} 
 
// Network creation   
ask farmer { 
friendship <- rnd(0, no_friends) among (farmer - self); 
neighborhood <- (my_farm.neighborhood collect 
each.my_farmer); } 
ask one_of(farm) { 
my_farmer.in_collective <- true ; 
ask farm at_distance(collective_distance) { 
my_farmer.in_collective <- true ;}} 
ask farmer where(each.in_collective){ 




/*GLOBAL-REFLEX */  
 
/* Innovation status: Closed */  
reflex initial_innovation_status when: cycle < 
year_innovation{ 
ask (farmer){ 
innovation_status <- “Learning”;}} 
 
/* Innovation status: Initial Implementation */  
reflex innovation_trigger when: cycle = 
year_innovation{ 
ask 1 among (farmer where each.in_collective){ 
initial_innovation_farmer_collective <- false; 
innovation_status <- “Implementation”; 
year_implementation <- cycle;} 
ask 2 among (farmer where 
each.initial_innovation_farmer_collective){ 
innovation_status <- “Implementation”; 
year_implementation <- cycle;}} 
 
/* Innovation diffusion */  
reflex innovation_diffusion when: cycle >= 
year_innovation{ 
ask (farmer){ 
if length(trust_values.keys) = 0{ 
innovation_status <- “Learning”; 
}else{ 
if innovation_status = “Implementation” or 
innovation_status = “promotion”{ 
loop linked_farmer over: trust_values.keys { 
if linked_farmer.innovation_status = “Learning”{ 
linked_farmer.innovation_status <- “Receiving”;}}}}}} 
/* Social pressure estimation */  
reflex initial_social_pressure when: cycle >= 
year_innovation{  




if length(trust_values.keys) = 0{ 
internal_social_pressure <- 0.0; 
}else{ 
loop linked_farmer over: trust_values.keys { 
if linked_farmer.innovation_status = “Implementation” 
or innovation_status = “promotion”{  
internal_social_pressure <- ((count(farmer, 
each.innovation_status = “promotion”) + count(farmer, 
each.happy = true ))/length(linked_farmer));}}}} 
social_pressure <- external_social_pressure 
+internal_social_pressure;} 
 
/* Benefit analysis */  
reflex benefit_calculations { 
ask farm{ 
if my_farmer.innovation_status = “Learning” or 
my_farmer.innovation_status = “Receiving”{ 
do initial_farm_calculations;} 
if my_farmer.innovation_status = “Implementation” or 
my_farmer.innovation_status = “promotion”{ 
do new_farm_calculations;} 
mean_Co <+ (farm mean_of last(each.Co)/4); 
mean_Po <+ (farm mean_of last(each.Po)/4); 
mean_Irr <+ (farm mean_of last (each.Irr)/4); 
mean_GWL <+ (farm mean_of last (each.GWL)/4); 
mean_SL <+ (farm mean_of last (each.SL)/4); 
mean_GWL_D_P <+ (farm mean_of last 
(each.GWL_D_P)); 
mean_Sal_D_P <+ (farm mean_of last (each.Sal_D_P)); 
mean_GWL_D_S <+ (farm mean_of last 
(each.GWL_D_S)); 
mean_Sal_D_S <+ (farm mean_of last (each.Sal_D_S)); 
mean_GWL_DR <+ (farm mean_of last (each.GWL_DR)); 
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mean_Sal_DR <+ (farm mean_of last (each.Sal_DR));} 
ask farmer { 
if innovation_status = “Learning” or innovation_status = 
“Receiving”{ 
do initial_farmer_calculation;} 
if innovation_status = “Implementation” or 
innovation_status = “promotion”{ 
do new_farmer_calculation;} 
mean_Be <+ (farmer mean_of last(each.Be));}} 
 
/* End simulation */  




grid plot height: 8 width: 1{ 
rgb color <- #khaki;} 
 
/*FARM*/ 
















geometry shape <- square(rnd(200, 500)); 
aspect default { 
if Farm{ 
draw shape color: #green; 
}else { 
draw shape color: #white;}} 
action initial_farm_calculations{ 
farm_area <- (shape.area); 
GWL <- GWL + 
[(farm_area*(float(data[5,cycle])))/30000]; 
SL <- SL + [(farm_area*(float(data[6,cycle])))/30000]; 
Irr <- Irr + [(farm_area*(float(data[7,cycle])))/30000]; 
Po <- Po + [(farm_area*(float(data[8,cycle])))/30000]; 
Co <- Co + [(farm_area*(float(data[9,cycle])))/30000]; 
GWL_DR <- GWL_DR + [(float(data[10,cycle]))]; 
GWL_D_S <- GWL_D_P + [(float(data[11,cycle]))]; 
GWL_D_P <- GWL_D_P + [(float(data[12,cycle]))]; 
Sal_DR <- Sal_DR + [(float(data[13,cycle]))]; 
Sal_D_S <- Sal_D_S + [(float(data[14,cycle]))]; 
Sal_D_P <- Sal_D_P + [(float(data[15,cycle]))];} 
action new_farm_calculations { 
farm_area <- (shape.area); 
GWL <- GWL + 
[(farm_area*(float(data[0,cycle])))/30000]; 
SL <- SL + [(farm_area*(float(data[1,cycle])))/30000]; 
Irr <- Irr + [(farm_area*(float(data[2,cycle])))/30000]; 
Po <- Po + [(farm_area*(float(data[3,cycle])))/30000]; 
Co <- Co + [(farm_area*(float(data[4,cycle])))/30000]; 
GWL_DR <- GWL_DR + [(float(data[10,cycle]))]; 
GWL_D_S <- GWL_D_P + [(float(data[11,cycle]))]; 
GWL_D_P <- GWL_D_P + [(float(data[12,cycle]))]; 
Sal_DR <- Sal_DR + [(float(data[13,cycle]))]; 
Sal_D_S <- Sal_D_S + [(float(data[14,cycle]))]; 
Sal_D_P <- Sal_D_P + [(float(data[15,cycle]))];}} 
 
/*Farmer*/ 







bool in_collective <- false; 
bool initial_innovation_farmer_collective <- true ; 
bool happy <- false; 
int year_implementation; 
string innovation_status <- “Learning” among: 
[“Learning”,”Receiving”, “Implementation”, 
“promotion”]; 
image_file icon_closed <- 
image_file(“../includes/closed.png”); 
image_file icon_happy <- 
image_file(“../includes/happy.png”); 
image_file icon_implementation <- 
image_file(“../includes/implementation.png”); 
image_file icon_promotion <- 
image_file(“../includes/promotion.png”); 
image_file icon_reception <- 
image_file(“../includes/reception.png”); 
aspect default { 
if Farmer_Icon { 
if innovation_status = “Learning” { 
draw icon_closed size:pic_size;}  
if innovation_status = “Receiving” { 
draw icon_reception size:pic_size;} 
if innovation_status = “Implementation” { 
draw icon_implementation size:pic_size;}  
if innovation_status = “promotion” { 
if happy { 
draw icon_happy size:pic_size; 
}else { 
draw icon_promotion size:pic_size;}}} else { 
draw circle(5) color: #black;}} 
map<farmer,float> trust_values; 
action initialize_trust { 
if in_collective{ 
loop i over: remove_duplicates(neighborhood + 
friendship + collective) { 
float initial_value <- 0.0; 
if i in neighborhood{ 
initial_value <- N_trust;} 
if i in friendship { 
initial_value <- F_trust;} 
if i in collective { 
initial_value <- C_trust;} 
trust_values[i] <- initial_value; } 
} else { 
loop i over: remove_duplicates(neighborhood + 
friendship + collective) { 
float initial_value <- 0.0; 
if i in neighborhood{ 
initial_value <- N_trust;} 
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if i in friendship { 
initial_value <- F_trust;} 
if i.in_collective { 
initial_value <- C_trust*trust_in_collective;} 
trust_values[i] <- initial_value; }}} 
aspect links { 
if (Display_trust) { 
loop all_farmers over: remove_duplicates(friendship + 
collective + neighborhood) { 
draw line ([location, all_farmers.location]) + 
1.5*(trust_values[all_farmers]) color: #black;}} 
if (Neighborhood_links) { 
loop all_farmers over: neighborhood { 
draw line ([location, all_farmers.location]) color: #red;}} 
if (Friendship_links) { 
loop all_farmers over: friendship { 
draw line ([location, all_farmers.location]) color: #blue; 
}} 
if (Collective_links) { 
loop all_farmers over: collective { 
draw line ([location, all_farmers.location]) color: 
#purple;}}} 
 
/*Innovation stage: Learning */ 
action initial_farmer_calculation { 
Be <- Be + (my_farm.Co[cycle]/(my_farm.Po[cycle]*10)) 
+ (my_farm.SL[cycle]/my_farm.GWL[cycle]);} 
 
/*Innovation stage: Implementation */ 
action new_farmer_calculation { 




/*Innovation stage: Receiving */ 
reflex reception when:(innovation_status = 
“Receiving”){ 
float R; 
int counter <- 0; 
float happy_coeff; 
loop linked_farmer over: trust_values.keys{ 
if linked_farmer.happy{ 
happy_coeff <- 1 + happy_impact; 
}else { 
happy_coeff <- 1;} 
R <- R + 
((linked_farmer.Be[cycle]*trust_values[linked_farmer]))
*happy_coeff*comm_eff; 
counter <- counter + 1;} 
if counter = 0 { 
R <- 0; 
}else { 
R <- R / counter;} 
if Be[cycle] < R { 
innovation_status <- “Implementation”; 
year_implementation <- cycle;}} 
/*Innovation stage: Promotion */ 
reflex promotion when:(innovation_status = 
“Implementation” and cycle > year_implementation){ 
float P; 
int counter <- 0; 
loop linked_farmer over: trust_values.keys{ 
P <- P + 
(linked_farmer.Be[cycle]*trust_values[linked_farmer])*
comm_eff; 
counter <- counter + 1;} 
if counter = 0 { 
P <- 0; 
}else { 
P <- P / counter;} 
if Be[cycle] > P { 
innovation_status <- “promotion”;}} 
reflex happy when:(innovation_status = “promotion”){ 
float average <- mean(3 last Be); 
if average < Be[cycle]{ 
happy <- true ; 
happy_farmers <- happy_farmers + 1;} 
else { 
happy <- false; 
innovation_status <- “Receiving”;}}} 
experiment SAHI_O  type: gui keep_seed: true  { 
float minimum_cycle_duration <- 0.4; 
 
reflex results { 
ask simulations{ 
save [cycle, (farm mean_of last (each.Po))] to: 
"Po_results_" + Policy_Scenario + "_" + Behavior_Theory 
+ ".csv" type: csv rewrite: false; 
save [cycle, (farm mean_of last (each.GWL_DR)), (farm 
mean_of last (each.GWL_D_P)), (farm mean_of 
last(each.GWL_D_S))] to: "GW_D_results_" + 
Policy_Scenario + "_" + Behavior_Theory + ".csv" type: 
csv rewrite: false; 
save [cycle, (farm mean_of last (each.Sal_DR)), (farm 
mean_of last (each.Sal_D_P)), (farm mean_of 
last(each.Sal_D_S))] to: "Sal_D_results_" + 
Policy_Scenario + "_" + Behavior_Theory + ".csv" type: 
csv rewrite: false; 
save [cycle,(farmer count (each.innovation_status = 
“Learning”)),(farmer count (each.innovation_status = 
“Receiving”)),(farmer count (each.innovation_status = 
“Implementation”)),(farmer count 
(each.innovation_status = “promotion”)),(farmer count 
(each.happy = true ))] to: "farmer_results_" + 
Policy_Scenario + "_" + Behavior_Theory + ".csv" type: 




488,3::3512])::4981]) tabs:false toolbars:false editors: 
false parameters:true  consoles:false navigator:false 
tray:false; 
display map { 
grid plot lines: #darkkhaki; 
species farm transparency: 0.4; 
species farmer aspect: links; 
species farmer;} 
display "Results over distance" type: java2D { 
chart "Groundwater levels" size: {1.0,0.5} position: {0, 
0}type: series   
title_font: ‘SanSerif’  
title_font_size: 13.0  
label_font: ‘SanSerif’  
label_font_size: 10 
legend_font_style: ‘plain’  
legend_font: ‘SanSerif’ 
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legend_font_size: 10  
x_label: "Distance from sea [m]"  
x_serie_labels: (2000+((cycle)*400)) 
tick_font_size: 10 
y_label: "Groundwater Level [m]"  
y_tick_line_visible: false  
x_tick_line_visible: false{ 
data "Reference [m]" value: mean_GWL_DR 
marker_shape: marker_empty style: spline color: #red; 
data "Profitable solution [m]" value: mean_GWL_D_P 
marker_shape: marker_empty style: spline color: #blue; 
data "Sustainable solution [m]" value: mean_GWL_D_S 
marker_shape: marker_empty style: spline color: 
#green;} 
chart "Salinity levels" size: {1.0,0.5} position: {0, 0.5} 
type: series   
background: rgb (248, 248, 248,255) 
title_font: ‘SanSerif’  
title_font_size: 13.0  
label_font: ‘SanSerif’  
label_font_size: 10  
legend_font_style: ‘plain’  
legend_font: ‘SanSerif’ 
legend_font_size: 10  
x_label: "Distance from sea [m]"  
x_serie_labels: (2000+((cycle)*400)) 
tick_font_size: 10  
y_label: "Salinity [dS/m]"  
y_tick_line_visible: false  
x_tick_line_visible: false{ 
data "Reference [dS/m]" value: mean_Sal_DR 
marker_shape: marker_empty style: spline color: #red; 
data "Profitable solution [dS/m]" value: mean_Sal_D_P 
marker_shape: marker_empty style: spline color: #blue; 
data "Sustainable solution [dS/m]" value: 
mean_Sal_D_S marker_shape: marker_empty style: 
spline color: #green;}} 
display "Results over time" type: java2D { 
chart "Groundwater Levels" size: {1.0,0.25} position: {0, 
0}type: series   
title_font: ‘SanSerif’  
title_font_size: 13.0  
label_font: ‘SanSerif’  
label_font_size: 10  
legend_font_style: ‘plain’  
legend_font: ‘SanSerif’ 
legend_font_size: 10  
x_label: "Time steps [3 years]" 
x_serie_labels: cycle 
tick_font_size: 10 
y_label: "Groundwater Level [m]"  
y_tick_line_visible: false  
x_tick_line_visible: false{ 
data "Groundwater Level [m]" value: mean_GWL 
marker_shape: marker_empty style: spline color: #blue 
;} 
chart "Salinity Levels" size: {1.0,0.25} position: {0, 0.25} 
type: series   
background: rgb (248, 248, 248,255) 
title_font: ‘SanSerif’  
title_font_size: 13.0  
label_font: ‘SanSerif’  
label_font_size: 10 
legend_font_style: ‘plain’  
legend_font: ‘SanSerif’ 
legend_font_size: 10  
x_label: "Time steps [3 years]" 
x_serie_labels: cycle 
tick_font_size: 10 
y_label: "Salinity [dS/m]"  
y_tick_line_visible: false  
x_tick_line_visible: false{ 
data "Salinity [dS/m]" value: mean_SL marker_shape: 
marker_empty style: spline color: #red;} 
chart "Profit" size: {1.0,0.25} position: {0, 0.5} type: 
series 
title_font: ‘SanSerif’  
title_font_size: 13.0  
label_font: ‘SanSerif’  
label_font_size: 10  
legend_font_style: ‘plain’  
legend_font: ‘SanSerif’ 
legend_font_size: 10  
x_label: "Time steps [3 years]" 
x_serie_labels: cycle 
tick_font_size: 10 
y_label: "10^6 [$]"  
y_tick_line_visible: false  
x_tick_line_visible: false{ 
data "Profit 10^6 [$]" value: mean_Po marker_shape: 
marker_empty style: spline color: #green;} 
chart "Irrigation costs" size: {1.0,0.25} position: {0, 0.75} 
type: series 
background: rgb (248, 248, 248,255) 
title_font: ‘SanSerif’  
title_font_size: 13.0  
label_font: ‘SanSerif’  
label_font_size: 10 
legend_font_style: ‘plain’  
legend_font: ‘SanSerif’ 
legend_font_size: 10  
x_label: "Time steps [3 years]" 
x_serie_labels: cycle 
tick_font_size: 10 
y_label: "10^5 [$]"  
y_tick_line_visible: false  
x_tick_line_visible: false{ 
data "Costs 10^5 [$]" value: mean_Co marker_shape: 
marker_empty style: spline color: #blue;}} 
display “Status of Farmers” type: java2D { 
chart “Innovation Status of Farmers” type:histogram 
style:stack   
title_font: ‘SanSerif’  
title_font_size: 13.0  
label_font: ‘SanSerif’  
label_font_size: 10 
legend_font_style: ‘plain’  
legend_font: ‘SanSerif’ 
legend_font_size: 10  
x_label: "Time steps [3 years]" 
x_serie_labels: cycle 
tick_font_size: 10 
y_label: “Number of Farmers”  
y_tick_line_visible: false  
x_tick_line_visible: false{ 
data “Learning” value: length(farmer where 
(each.innovation_status = “Learning”)) 
accumulate_values: true  color: rgb (88, 88, 88,255); 
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data “Receiving” value: length(farmer where 
(each.innovation_status = “Receiving”)) 
accumulate_values: true  color: rgb (63, 72, 
204,255); 
data “Implementation” value: (farmer count 
(each.innovation_status = “Implementation”)) 
accumulate_values: true  color: rgb (139, 56, 183,255); 
data “promotion” value: (length(farmer where 
(each.innovation_status = “promotion”))-length(farmer 
where (each.happy = true ))) accumulate_values: true  
color: rgb (149, 91, 58,255); 
data “Satisfied” value: length(farmer where 
(each.happy = true )) accumulate_values: true  color: 
rgb (213, 25, 32,255);}}}} 









Appendix B. SAHIO’s Decision-Making Process for Each MoHuB 
Theory 
 
Figure B. 1: MoHuB for Homo Economicus Theory. 
 
Figure B. 2: MoHuB for Bounded Rationality Theory. 
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Figure B. 3: MoHuB for Theory of Planned Behavior. 
 
 
Figure B. 4: MoHuB for Habitual Learning Theory 
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Figure B. 5: MoHuB for Descriptive Norm Theory. 
 

















Appendix C. SAHIO A-S-H Innovation Results 
 
Figure C. 1: Results of Baseline Scenario. 
 
 
Figure C. 2: Results of Water Policy Scenario. 
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D.1 Evaluation of Hydroclimatic Variability and Prospective 
Irrigation Strategies in the U.S. Corn Belt. 
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D.2 A Serious Board Game to Analyze Socio-Ecological Dynamics 
towards Collaboration in Agriculture. 
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D.2.1 MAHIZ Rulebook 
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D.2.2 MAHIZ Feedback Form 
1 
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